With the improved security situation in Kashmir, expectations for normalcy in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) have risen. Following the August 5, 2019 decision, India dismantled Pakistani-established networks supporting separatists and terrorists. This led to reduced violence, fair elections, and ongoing societal rebuilding, despite emerging threats in the Jammu Division.

With the improvement in the security situation in Kashmir there was an air of expectation about the march towards normality in J&K. Triggered by the decision of 5 Aug 2019, India displayed a resolute attitude to dismantle much of what Pakistan had established over the last many years, in the form of networks and enablers to support the separatists, the over ground workers (OGW) and the terrorists. Methodically the terror financing web was neutralized as were the various OGW networks down to the ‘tehsil’ and ‘halqa’ level.    The caustic Kashmiri media, both Hindi and English, was largely marginalized with part censorship and part withholding of revenues coming from government advertisements. With recruitment down to a trickle and youth fairly enthused by the environment of openness and lack of violence, after long the Kashmiri people were beginning to enjoy themselves, something they are well known for, given the long periods of bleak and cold weather. Even infiltration was down to a trickle and with mainstream politics out of the way, the rebuilding of society had begun. An enthusiastic Lt Governor remained  focused on the development agenda, bringing in a fresh bureaucracy aimed to root out the famed corruption of J&K. With violence low and people willing to express their democratic choice a fair and transparent election to the Lok Sabha involving five seats (two in Jammu and three in Kashmir) was conducted in May 2024 resulting in an average 58% turnout of the electorate. Encouraged by this, polls to the J&K Assembly are being contemplated; a directive of the Supreme Court of India to conduct these before Sep 30 2024 exists and all seemed well for the same to be executed.

Leaving Kashmir aside, Pakistan has trained its guns on the region South of the Pir Panjal range, commonly referred to by the umbrella term, Jammu Division. An upsurge of terrorist related violence progressively over the last two years, and a sudden spurt since the last two months or so has clearly indicated that fresh infiltration has taken place in this division, terrorists have been lying low so as to avoid detection and profiling by Police.

Why Jammu? And Why Now?

In a nutshell India has concerns about five areas in J&K and Ladakh – the LoC in Jammu and the same in Kashmir, the hinterland in Kashmir and the same in Jammu division. If all of them are under adverse security threat our resources could be limited and prioritisation would be done. This is exactly what happened over the past many years. As terrorism waned from Jammu’s heartland the LoC remained on priority but not the CT grid. In Kashmir both, the LoC and the hinterland were important due to the disingenuous networks that were established over years. These extended to terror financing, stone throwing, mosque power, rabble rousers, drugs/narcotics, weapons and media. Thus, creating a web on which the separatist and terrorist movement thrived. Since 05 Aug 2019 much of these have been dismantled; it’s therefore difficult for terror groups to execute actions in Kashmir. Then came the 2020 activation of the LAC in Ladakh for which troops were needed in a hurry. Jammu hinterland with a low terror profile was comparatively easier to dilute.

Decision making can be a challenge in the absence of inputs in an environment where threats are high and resources low. We optimised. Perhaps the only regret one can express is the fact that we downplayed the possibility of a deliberate revival effort in the Jammu division which could thrive under the radar. Perhaps so focused were we on Kashmir that the realisation that Pakistan could use Jammu to manoeuver and target the actual center of gravity in Kashmir, did not easily occur.

Is the Situation  Worse Than Any Time in The Last Ten Years ?

In statistical terms Jammu division may not have seen our own casualties of such numbers for long and the presence of an estimated 40-50 terrorists in the Pir Panjal South region too hasn’t been witnessed for some time. Jammu division has seen bad days too but mostly in spurts. In 2003 the higher reaches of the Pir Panjal were similarly occupied by terrorists in an area called Hilkaka. They were neutralised in a massive operation involving almost two brigades over a sustained period. By 2009 or so things became quieter thus facilitating the thinning out of the Army formations which had reinforced the area. In 2014-16 there were some terrorist attacks in Jammu city and near Samba-Hiranagar prompting reinforcement of the counter infiltration grid in the International Boundary (IB) sector. After 5 Aug 2019 when Article 370 got abrogated attention remained focused on Kashmir although efforts to link the potential Punjab militancy through Pathankot to Jammu remained a feasibility. Support networks of the terrorists in this region seemed to have remained largely unaffected due to the emphasis we lay on Kashmir.  The presumption perhaps was that with terror at a low key in Jammu division networks did not exist. However,  networks can remain under the radar to be activated when required by the sponsor state (Pakistan) in the case of proxy war, which is what J&K is all about.  A lot of money exists in the region and it goes far beyond ethnic and religious loyalties, in the sense many will be willing to work for the extra buck irrespective of their faith or ethnicity.

 Why at this Time ?

It makes a lot of sense for Pakistan to activate the Jammu front at this time. The Lok Sabha elections revealed a cementing situation for India. 58% average turnout is not something Pakistan would welcome. Yet to start something prematurely and seriously disturb J&K would give the BJP government an electoral advantage. Hence it had to commence after 9 Jun 2024 (date of Government’s inauguration) but the interim period was perhaps used to induct trained cadres (not too many), just the optimum number. The temptation to induct regular well-trained soldiers in garb of terrorists could not be resisted because results desired were to be immediate lest the assembly elections gather momentum and India disregards the violence as of no consequence. In 1999 too, Pakistan inducted its regular soldiers to the unoccupied Kargil heights and tried to pass them off as ‘mujahideen’.  The current Jammu based terrorists have probably laid low and away from populated areas. Probably monumental amounts of money may have exchanged hands to buy off portions of the local population and convert them to becoming OGWs and then take their logistics support. No records of the terrorists appear to exist, thus proving their fresh entry into the region.

What will be the Outcome of the Pressure the Army is Mounting?

The Army has apparently managed to somewhat stabilise the Poonch-Rajouri belt through some fresh deployment.  There is a noticeable shift towards the Doda –  Reasi – Kathua belt, a vast space with treacherous mountains, vegetation and low density of troops. There is movement of troops for deployment which is taking place but raw troops untrained for these types of operations may sometimes prove counterproductive.  Sufficiency of troops is important but it is the sufficiency of functional CT networks, intelligence and liaison that will fetch dividends with a heavy dose of back to basics in patrolling, Search and Destroy Operations (SADO) and persistence in operations. It takes a toll on operational effectiveness of units. It is learnt that Operation Sarp Vinash 2.0 has been launched too. The first such operation was launched in Apr 2003 in the area called Hilkaka, high up in the Pir Panjal mountains above the Surankot area. It was done with inclusion of two aspects which proved crucial. First, was the construction of Mi-17 helipads   at different heights so that logistical sustenance could be placed there. This catered for persistent operations and not the restricted 72-hour forays limited by logistics. The second was that the Army’s 15 Corps placed stops all along the karewas (plateaus) of the Shupiyan area in the Valley. These stops had the killing zones right ahead of them as terrorists came trickling down, under pressure of the ‘search and churn’ operations by the Romeo Force (RR). This is why knowledge of the history of operations in the region is an essentiality in any leadership position in J&K.

There is another example of this which needs study. In 1999, at the height of Kargil operations, the Handwara area near Rajwar Forest and the Meganwar Ridge came alive. Reports were rife that a few Pakistan Army regulars had entered the region through Lipa Valley and were providing leadership to the cadres. When Operation Vijay was physically called off a full division size force stayed back in the Valley for almost four months. Its task was to churn up all the jungles and mountains which it did very effectively; but not a terrorist was killed. What resulted was the destruction of innumerable terrorist hideouts along with ration and stocked water. The result of this was that terrorists were forced to redeploy to lower areas and into villages where we picked up quick intelligence and neutralised the terrorists. Victor Force was averaging almost 30 terrorists killed every month in the winter of 1999-2000.   The importance of physical search has to be realized. It’s not a shot in the dark as many may label it.

Can all this Escalate to another Dimension

There is always a demand from the less informed that India should proactively launch operations to punish Pakistan for its interference in Jammu division. None who recommend this go beyond the first level and or ever mention the intensity and the targets. Are we to go to full scale war immediately? What are the objectives, capabilities of self and the adversary, international response and outcomes expected? If it’s a one-off action be assured, he will respond too and the to and from terrorist activity we expect will halt will actually only intensify. It is good to remain balanced, seek diplomacy to engage the big powers, secure ourselves to render actions by terrorists ineffective and remain in that mode for a generation more in order to derive the full benefit of the bold decision of Aug 05 2019. A decision to launch operations across the LoC may well be taken in a calibrated way because national confidence also cannot be allowed to flag. Thus ceasefire could dilute to a great extent; in that event we should have the full sanction to conduct trans LoC actions as deemed fit by the Army at the operational level.

Pakistan is playing its cards well thus far. It has not uttered a word on the Jammu attacks. It has internally undertaken a counter terror operation, Operation Azm-e-Istekham against the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, in order to offset any feasibility of the Indian allegations sticking to it.  The perception being promoted demands the credibility of the notion that nations themselves under terror attacks do not indulge in transnational terrorism. Yet, political considerations also cannot be wished away. In the wake of Operation Parakram we remained hesitant to respond across the IB because of the nuclear angle which then was insufficiently understood, being just three years old. Post 26/11, such decisions were still wanting more because of international pressures. In 2016 the surgical strikes and in 2019 the Balakot air strikes both proved that adequate space existed below the threshold of nuclear exchange, to respond to any Pakistani sponsored terror acts.

The importance of National War Gaming has to be realized so that the political decision making is laced with military wisdom. Our response cannot be notional and below par in terms of effect; it has to hurt the interests of the other side and effectively convey our intent to ratchet up the same several notches as we progress. While considering these decisions, no doubt the political and military leadership will consider the larger effect of expanded conflict and other national borders too.