The dance of political-military strategy has always been tortuous. Through the ages, war was the primary domain where strategy could be applied, and develop to a stage where it now underlines so many functional domains. While politico-military considerations, have very seldom in the history of conflict, been perfectly composed at the outset, their imbalanced manifestations in the 21st century, has led to unforgiving outcomes. The interplay between politics and military strategy has always been complex. Historically, war was the primary domain where strategy evolved, shaping many functional areas. However, in the 21st century, the imbalance between political and military considerations has often led to unforgiving consequences. Given the pressures of time, space, and cognition, corrective measures are limited once a course is set.

Taking lessons from history, Operation Overlord (Normandy, 1944) was a high point in strategic planning, though not without its complications. One of its fiercest critics was British PM Churchill, yet the collective strategic vision prevailed under General Eisenhower and Supreme Allied Headquarters. This decisive action liberated Europe well before alternative strategies could have achieved the same outcome. Post-WWII, NATO and coalition forces functioned efficiently due to these joint wartime experiences. However, today, that Western military-political alliance is facing an existential crisis.

The DNA of modern warfare can be traced back to the American Civil War. Despite lasting formally four years, it demonstrated clear political objectives, yet both sides struggled militarily to meet them. Arrogance and disdain led to the failure of European powers to study this war, resulting in WWI’s catastrophic miscalculations. If WWII represents strategic success, WWI exemplifies the worst politico-military failures – marked by delusion, arrogance, and lack of convergence between leaders and military commanders.

Post-WWII Conflicts: Politico-Military Disconnect

Post-WWII conflicts have demonstrated varying levels of strategic coherence. Wars such as Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria highlight politico-military dissonance, serving as cautionary tales for statesmen and military strategists.

India, by contrast, has displayed strategic cohesion and synergy on key occasions. The 1965, 1971, and 1999 wars showcased a clear national vision and military execution. Operation Cactus (1988) in the Maldives was another instance of well-coordinated strategy. Less remembered but equally significant was India’s Somalia mission (1993-1995), where an Indian Brigade Group, operating under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, functioned with complete self-sufficiency. The Indian forces executed their responsibilities professionally, earning respect from the Somalis, with minimal casualties. Unlike other contingents, India’s mission concluded with national honour intact, a testament to successful politico-military coordination.

The 21st Century and the ICT Challenge

The 21st century, marked by the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) revolution, has reshaped the battlefield. The term “revolution” is misleading, as ICT developments continue to accelerate. Warfare today spans multiple dimensions—physical, cognitive, and informational—creating unprecedented challenges in planning and decision-making. Strategic outcomes are more precarious than ever, reinforcing the need for politico-military alignment well in advance since opportunities for mid-course corrections are fleeting.

Conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Russia-Ukraine, and Israel offer important insights. However, these lessons must be drawn selectively—they do not provide universal principles, especially in the “Grey Zone” of hybrid warfare or No Contact Wars. Despite technological advancements, controlling geographic territory remains essential, underscoring the continued relevance of territorial security in modern conflict.

Death of Strategy

There is no finer example of death of strategy, than the campaigns of Alexander of Macedon 336-323 BCE. His strategic partiality dates back to the Thracian General Epaminondas. It in essence involved identifying in a battle space, the most critical element which if removed/defeated, would ensure capitulation. Alexander applied this assiduously from the commencement of his campaigns and more significantly at Gaugamela 331BCE. The strategy invariably worked against the Persians, since Darius never stood and fought, in the bargain losing all. Shortly thereafter, Alexander faced Porus on the Jhelum River, and here his strategy died. Porus never left the battlefield. He stood and fought. There are conflicting views on the outcome of this battle. Space does not permit me to digress. However, the death of Alexander’s strategy was clearly evident.

In the history of warfare, especially during the World Wars, ‘Death of Strategy’ could be warded off due to opportunities for recovery and riposte. In the extant 21stCentury paradigm, ‘Death of Strategy’ can happen abruptly with painful consequences. Take the Russian Offensive into Kyiv, 24 Feb 2022. The ‘coup de main’ attempt to capture Hostomel Airport, failed due to the unforeseen and tenacious Ukrainian resistance. The far-reaching strategy to capture the capital and ensure capitulation of Ukraine in 72 hours, was conclusively dislocated.

Generations and Waves of Warfare

There have been multiple efforts to classify warfare into generations or waves, but such rigid categorizations are misleading. Warfare evolves by adding layers, not discarding previous modes. No form of warfare, regardless of how outdated it may seem, has ever been entirely abandoned.

The American Civil War was fought across two dimensions—land and water. In contrast, World War II expanded to four geographic dimensions while incorporating the information and communications domain. By the war’s end, a new spectrum—nuclear warfare—had emerged, permanently altering global security paradigms.

Today, warfare spans 5½ physical domains and at least 4–5 spectra. Despite technological advancements, traditional close-combat weapons remain essential—many armies, including ours, still retain the bayonet, Khukri, and Dah. Their continued use underscores a fundamental reality: physical elimination of the enemy remains a necessity. Each new dimension of warfare is layered onto existing ones. The art of Generalship lies in ensuring that these layers operate synergistically to achieve military objectives. This reality thus highlights the truth of obsolescence—tanks are not outdated, nor are RPVs/Drones the universal solution to future conflicts.

Excessively Politicized Strategies

Political grandstanding and shrill agendas rarely translate into effective military strategy. When political aspirations are detached from military realities, the consequences are catastrophic. Syria exemplifies this failure, where conflicting political interests, varying military capabilities, and fractured human geography have reduced vast areas to ruins, unfit for habitation.

Afghanistan and Iraq further illustrate how convoluted strategic-political intentions have left behind instability and conflict. The failure to eliminate DAISH (ISIS) in Iraq allowed them to expand into Syria, giving them the momentum to establish a Caliphate. Even though the Caliphate was destroyed, its long-term consequences persist.

The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war reinforces this pattern. Neither Russia’s initial war objectives nor Ukraine’s maximalist political demands appear militarily achievable. The war continues, shaped by flawed strategic calculations and politicized expectations detached from battlefield realities.

International Game Play

International security guarantees have consistently proven unreliable, full of ambiguity and equivocation. The post-Cold War world has done little to change this fundamental reality. No nation can afford to base its security strategy on external assurances, written or verbal, without exposing itself to self-inflicted vulnerabilities.

A more concerning phenomenon today is the outsourcing of strategic decision-making to global centers of power in times of conflict. Any national security policy that allows external influence over its war aims is doomed from the outset.

Ukraine serves as a stark reminder—the security commitments given to it in 1994, when it relinquished nuclear weapons, have proven hollow. Similarly, in the ongoing Israel conflict, external interests shift fluidly, dictated by political expediency rather than steadfast commitments.

This reality is worsened by the dysfunctional UN Security Council, which has been effectively paralyzed on critical global issues. Nations must recognize that external guarantees are no substitute for robust, self-reliant defence strategies.

Dominant Air Power

Off the 5 ½ geographic domains that war will be waged in, the need for air dominance looms large. Whether helicopter or fixed-wing aircraft, to hold ground and secure territory, there is no option for worthwhile outcomes, without dominant Air Power. I shy away from the semantics of terms such as favourable air situations, or air superiority since these for our examination are unimportant. The fact is that without dominant air power, nothing worthwhile can be attained by politico-military strategic planning. No strategic planner can take a rain check on Air Power, without risking serious adverse outcomes.

A caveat remains. While Air Power remains irreplaceable for the conflict on land or sea, its demerits that emerged in the Second World War, continue to haunt the land battle. Evidenced in Syria and Iraq, dominant air was instrumental in taking the battle, into its final successful stages. The use of air power however, especially in built-up areas left behind tons of collapsed structures, masonry and destroyed infrastructure. These concrete mazes in effect aggravated the problems for the land forces, providing havens for defenders to delay capture. The battles for Raqqa, Mosul, Idlib and other towns are instructive.

We are not concerned with the colour of uniforms Air Force or Army Air, the domain is treated as one entity. Excluded however from this is the use of RPVs/Drones. These in my understanding, comprise the ½ domain of the 5 ½. It is also clear that this Drone domain, does not comprise dominant air power, and in no way is a substitute for it. Russian and Ukrainian operations have languished without effective air power. On the other hand, Israeli operations have been characterised by Air Superiority, imparting a certain impunity to the battle space.

Combat Arms

In land warfare, the traditional classification of combat arms remains valid. Infantry and Armour, supported by engineers, artillery, and signals, continue to form the backbone of military operations. However, the need for seamless integration has become more critical than ever in the complex battlespace of the 21st century.

Infantry and Armour are the only arms capable of manoeuvering, closing in with the enemy, and destroying it while also securing ground. Their effectiveness is significantly enhanced through close coordination with helicopters and drones, which provide real-time battlefield intelligence, force multiplication, and precision strike capabilities. Infantry, in all its specialised forms—mechanised, airborne, heli-landed, and special forces—remains an indispensable force. Meanwhile, tanks have evolved from their initial deployments to modern-day battlefields, integrating advanced sensors, electronic warfare systems, and drone countermeasures to address evolving threats. Both infantry and armour face unprecedented challenges in contemporary warfare and must continuously adapt.

Traditional norms of troop deployment, exertion levels, and relief cycles require urgent re-evaluation. The intensity of modern conflicts, combined with sustained exposure to battle conditions, necessitates a fundamental shift in force employment and rotation strategies. Static doctrine will not survive the complexity of modern battlefields.

Logistics and Reserves

The role of logistics and reserves has fundamentally expanded in modern warfare. Operational logistics is no longer confined to battlefield support but is now integrated with national economic and strategic capabilities. Today, logistics is a direct function of national power, and no strategic exercise is complete without evaluating the country’s ability to sustain long-term military operations.

Reserves are no longer limited to troop reinforcements but now encompass diplomatic alliances, economic endurance, infrastructure development, and domestic arms production. A nation’s ability to transition to a wartime economy determines its strategic resilience. The logistics network—from supply chain management to battlefield replenishment—has transformed dramatically. The military’s sustainability in war now depends on precision stocking, real-time provisioning, and rapid battlefield logistics to maintain operational momentum.

Any national security strategy must fully integrate elements of national power, ensuring that when conflict arises, the military is fully equipped, sustained, and strategically positioned to achieve favourable outcomes. The wars of this century have shattered traditional notions of battlefronts. Conflict is no longer limited to distant frontiers—instead, battlespaces are fluid, unrestricted, and extend into civilian domains. Cities, infrastructure, and non-combatant zones are now strategic targets.

The prescience of Leon Trotsky’s words rings true today: “You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.” Modern warfare is no longer about localized engagement. ; it is an all-encompassing national struggle where every sector of society plays a role.

In its inexorable dance Strategy has moved into the domain of the Devil. Challenged beginnings and uncertain outcomes confront planners. An unbroken promise of death and destruction is ever present. Both Victor and Second Best can gaze into the all-seeing mirror and conjecture, ‘Did we win?’ This brings to mind the sage advice of one who spent his life in conflict, the 10th Sikh Guru, Guru Gobind Singh;

“Chun kar az hamen, heelate dar guzasht,

Halal ast Burdhan, bi-Shamsheer dast”

Only when all other means have failed is it righteous to draw the Sword. – Zafarnama