“Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected.” Sun Tzu, the Art of War

High and rugged mountains divide India and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. They are a formidable obstacle with dizzy heights, steep slopes, rough terrain, extreme weather and intense cold. The Cease Fire Line (now called the Line of Control) which traces this divide between India and  Pakistan is held with great tenacity. Despite the hardships, troops deploy on dominating features and maintain an eyeball to eyeball contact never trusting even a slight movement by the enemy. Cross border artillery duels and pot shots by snipers are a daily event.  Deep ravines and nalas with their thick vegetation which lie between these dominating features are frequently used by infiltrators to cross over the porous borders. They however need to be supported by strong launch pads and bases which provide fire and logistic support to assist the infiltration. Ever since 1948, Pakistan has been using infiltrators and saboteurs regularly to cross over and create disturbances in Jammu and Kashmir.

The defenders who occupy dominating features cover all approaches by mines, obstacles and fire. The ravines and valleys are sought to be dominated by patrols, ambushes and raids. While infiltration is considered easy since every piece of ground cannot be occupied, patrolled or dominated on regular basis, attack/assault on a defended locality is a daunting task. The attacker must be very well prepared, trained and brave to attempt an assault against the well entrenched defender. He should have the ability to move fast and stealthily to surprise the enemy and dislodge him. Capturing even an inch of ground therefore requires a herculean effort coupled with drive, determination and a will to win against all odds. The mountain ranges also have many natural passes which are of great strategic importance and are obviously defended with intensity if located close to the Line of Control as Key Defended Localities. One such pass stands testimony to the prowess of the Indian Army,. They dared to attack and capture it despite being occupied as prepared defences by the enemy. Its capture in the 1965 Indo Pak War is a unique chapter in Military History of the Sub Continent.

This iconic pass whose capture ignites great passion and fervor even today in the minds of every soldier both Indian and Pakistani is ‘The Hajipir Pass’.

It sits at an altitude of 2,637 metres in the formidable Pir Panjal range in Pak Occupied Kashmir astride the old Poonch – Uri road (Both in India). The pass itself is dominated by three hill features namely Bedori (3760 metres) in the East, Sank (2895 metres) in the West and Lediwali Gali (3140 metres) in the North West. All of these features combined form a salient into the Indian Territory, known as the Hajipir Bulge. Bedori is 14 Km South East of Uri and Hajipir Pass is 10 km South West of Bedori. The Hajipir Bulge offers many infiltration routes into the Kashmir valley and the Pooch-Rajouri sector with Hajipir pass providing a vital logistic base and staging area. Its height also supports excellent Very High Frequency radio communications all around for command and control.

The bulge is extensively used by infiltrators who set up bases in the higher reaches of the Pir Panjal, merge with local people in the valleys and strike at opportune moments. In 1965 Pakistan planned to infiltrate small groups, concentrate them in towns and villages and mingle with the crowds during an important local festival and commence their operations.

The pass was captured by 1 PARACHUTE Regiment of the Indian Army who along with other units that participated in the operation exhibited extreme qualities of physical fitness, resilience and bravery against huge odds. It bears testimony to the strength and valour of the Indian Soldier. Exhibiting aggressive leadership, the Indian PM Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri decided to take the fight to the enemy camp by crossing the ceasefire line and capture the pass in a pre-emptive strike against the planned Pakistani aggression of Kashmir. Pakistani leaders failed to anticipate the daring Indian offensive and the defenders in them pass were taken by surprise when confronted with the ghost like raiders of the Indian Army.

The Background

On April 9, 1965, the Pak Army in an undeclared act of war crossed into the Rann of Kutch and captured many Indian posts. Later, Pakistan offered to negotiate which was not acceptable to India unless Pakistan vacated the positions. However an agreement was signed on June 30 in London and Pakistan withdrew its forces to its side of the border. Yet, even while cease-fire was being negotiated in Kutch, Pakistan was preparing to strike in Kashmir.

Pakistan planned to conduct a guerrilla operation in support of its design to capture Kashmir. The operation was code named Op Gibraltar. Some of the infiltrators were spotted by the local herdsmen who reported them to the security forces. Immediate counter operations were launched and they were captured, liquidated or ex-filtrated broken and demoralised. Within a week, Op Gibraltar had collapsed; it was an unmitigated disaster.

Fed up with Pakistan’s repeated violation of the cease fire line, the Indian Prime Minister said  “India cannot go on pushing the Pakistanis off its territory. If infiltration continues, we will have to carry the fight to the other side.” The Indian Army after a serious appreciation also concluded that the only way to stop infiltration was to cross the cease fire line and deny the infiltrators the launch pads and infiltration routes. One of the areas selected for the Attack by Infiltration was the Hajipir Pass with an aim to choke the Hajipir Bulge.

The task of capturing the pass was given to 68 Infantry Brigade located at Uri on the banks of River Jhelum in the Kashmir Valley placed under command the 19 Infantry Division. The plan was to attack the high pass from the West and East, diversionary attacks were also planned to complement the main effort. Adequate artillery support was planned for pre D Day bombardment and close fire support during the attack. These proved very effective in breaking up enemies prepared defences and provide very close and intimate support to the assaulting troops harassed by enemy automatics. The D Day was fixed as 25 Aug but had to be postponed to 26 Aug due to bad weather. While weather does make operations in the mountains difficult, it also provides cover and surprise to the attacker. A well executed attack under cover of bad weather and rough terrain from an unexpected direction can surprise and unsettle even the most prepared enemy. The element of surprise therefore would play a major role in conduct of this operation code named Op BAKSHI after the commander of 68 Infantry Brigade Brigadier ZA Bakshi.

A two pronged attack was planned with Western and Eastern approaches as under:-

Western Approach

1 PARA to capture Sank and Lediwali Gali by 0500 hours on D plus1 Day.

4 RAJPUT to pass through 1 PARA and capture Hajipir Pass by 1800 hour D-day plus 1. (1 PARA however completed the task on its own exploiting its gains as it went along)

Eastern Approach

19 PUNJAB to capture the Bedori feature by 0900 hours D plus1 Day, exploit west wards and establish contact with 1 PARA by 1800 hours on D plus1 Day. JAK RIF and 4 SIKH LIGHT INFANTRY were kept in reserve.

Nine Artillery Batteries were placed under command to support the attack.

The pre-dawn attack on 26 Aug was preceded with intense shelling and softening of the objectives. 1 PARA commenced the attack on SANK (2895 M): a formidable feature with well prepared defences, barbed wires and mines. Unfortunately the attack failed despite some very intense close quarter battle on a very wet and slippery ridge. Even gaining a foothold was becoming difficult. It was best to break contact and plan a night attack on 27 Aug with some additional firepower. When darkness settled on the steep hillside, a daring attack supported by Machine gun fire was launched. The enemy confident after its initial success in breaking up the assault was unsettled with the intensity of the fresh assault and fled leaving behind heavy weapons and 16 dead. The valiant attackers decided to press home the advantage and reinforce success by continuing to exploit further to capture the LADEWALI GALI (3140 M0 by 1400 hours on 28 Aug.

Meanwhile the mood after the capture of SANK was upbeat, having tasted the blood of success, Maj Ranjit Singh Dayal, the company commander was itching for more; he wanted to head straight for the terminal objective, the ‘Hajipir Pass’. Sensing victory, permission was immediately granted. A small self contained column from Alfa and Delta Coys was formed under Maj Dayal to advance to and capture the pass. The approach was very difficult and involved a climb of over 1200 metres in heavy rain and poor visibility. To maintain surprise Maj Dayal chose to move along the sides of a nala where heavy undergrowth and the defiladed approach covered his move well. The slopes however were very slippery and the going tough; it would in the defenders appreciation obviously be the most unexpected route.

Maj Dayal trusted the physical fitness of his column and was keen to use this to great advantage. After an arduous climb all night, the column reached the Uri – Poonch road at 0430 hours on the morning of 28 Aug about 10 KM below the pass and settled down for a much deserved rest. The men also consumed their meagre rations of ‘Shakarparas’ and biscuits.

No challenge, physical or otherwise could deter them from their arduous task. They then moved along the road and were close to the pass by 0900 hours. The enemy was truly surprised because the dark night, heavy rains and fog had covered the move of the raiders till they were right on their door steps. They immediately brought down heavy automatic fire from the western shoulder and the pass itself. Making another daring decision, Maj Dayal decided to climb a tough spur leading to a high ground above the pass and then roll down on the enemy. “The Weather was happy with us and suddenly came the rain which in its wake brought low hanging clouds providing much needed natural camouflage.” Maj Dayal would recall later.

Leaving behind a few men with the Artillery officer who brought down some heavy and accurate fire on the pass, Maj Dayal set foot for the final objective. There is a popular military saying: “When the going gets tough, the tough get going”; Maj Dayal and his small band of determined paratroopers were itching for the kill, they went up the hill like sure footed mountain goats and suddenly appeared above the pass. The enemy never imagined this could happen. From their dominating perch, the raiders of 1 PARA silenced the enemy automatics and rolled down towards the pass which was captured at 1000 hours on 28 Aug in broad daylight. The Pakistanis suffered a serious setback despite occupying strong defences supported by well sited automatics. He had been dislodged from his supposedly impregnable citadel by an able leader and his determined team.

The enemy brigade stung by the reverses counterattacked on 29 Aug. 1 PARA successfully repulsed the attack and consolidated its position at the pass by occupying other dominating features around. 1 PARA had resolutely overcome the rough terrain, bad weather and exhaustion to relentlessly press home the advantage and dislodge the enemy from ‘Hajipir Pass’.

1 PARA gave the enemy no time to regroup and continued to exploit success after success.

The eastern thrust was much slower and encountered stiff resistance at Bedori and Besali. 19 PUNJAB however kept on relentlessly and linked up with 1 PARA on 1 September. 93 Infantry Brigade moving up from the south succeeded in achieving a linkup at Kahuta on 10 Sep to close the mouth of the bulge and the entire Hajipir bulge came under the control of the Indian Army.