The Indian Ocean region in the early 1960s was witness to a dynamic maritime situation. Great Britain was in the process of winding down its presence and would withdraw ‘East of Suez’ in 1968. It had acceded space to the new superpower, the United States, which was in the process of asserting its presence and setting up new bases in the region. With the onset of the Cold War after the Suez Crisis, the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union too had started arming navies in the region, most notably Egypt and Indonesia.

The Indian Navy was virtually in a nascent state. Though the budget allocations after Independence were not high, a modest force was gradually building up. As part of the ‘Commonwealth’s defence against the Soviet Union’, Britain provided warships to India, as it did to the other members. Between 1947 and 1961, a reconditioned aircraft carrier, two reconditioned cruisers, six reconditioned destroyers, three anti-aircraft frigates, five anti-submarine frigates and six minesweepers were acquired. However, after India’s leadership of the non-aligned movement in the mid-1950s, supply of arms from the West slowed to a trickle. On the other hand, Pakistan’s membership of CENTO enabled it to get modern arms with relative ease. The most notable discrimination in the maritime field was the lease of the Tench-class submarine, PNS Ghazi, from the US in 1963. This forced India to turn to the Soviet Union for the supply of modern military hardware.

The Indo China conflict in 1962 led to a comprehensive review of national security to determine the pressing requirements of the defence services in view of hostile posturing by China and Pakistan. A separate Fleet, to be based at Visakhapatnam, was approved for the Navy, along with a submarine arm and other ships. However, the new platforms would only be realised commencing 1967 due to the more urgent requirements of the Army and Air Force. To relieve Army units for duty on the northern and western borders after 1962, the Indian Navy was charged with the duties of coastal defence and the garrisoning of the Andaman & Nicobar Islands. The latter had become critical because commencing 1963, Indonesia’s stance was markedly belligerent towards India.

Indonesian Navy was a formidable force in the 60s.  With Indonesian leaders voicing claims to Great Nicobar Island, security of the islands was a major factor in the minds of the Indian Navy, more so as Indonesia had dispatched a few naval units to Karachi to bolster the Pakistani Navy in 1965. It was this vulnerability in Jul/Aug 1965 that impelled Naval Headquarters to keep the Indian Naval Fleet in the Bay of Bengal to deter adventurist Indonesian naval moves.

When Pakistan launched ‘Operation Desert Hawk’ in April 1965 in the Rann of Kutch, the Indian Fleet, with Rear Admiral BA Samson, Flag Officer Commanding Indian Fleet (FOCIF) flying his flag on INS Vikrant, made a routine deployment to the Persian Gulf. Thereafter, the Fleet was deployed off Kutch, along with its escorts, for ‘Exercise Arrowhead’ with the Indian Army, where the local Army formations familiarized themselves with naval aircraft flown from the carrier. A number of firing exercises by naval ships and aircraft were also carried out and the Fleet provided logistics support for the Army troops due to poor road communications in the area.

When the Indian Armed Forces were put on an alert on 26 April 1965, in response to a general mobilisation ordered in Pakistan, INS Vikrant’s refit was postponed and she sailed out to embark her aircraft for a possible conflict. However, ceasefire negotiations began in early May and was finally declared on 30 June 1965, after which Vikrant entered refit to undertake much needed repairs. This resulted in Vikrant being unavailable for operations in September 1965, when the war finally broke out. It was a critical shortfall and highlighted the limitations of having a single aircraft carrier with the Navy!

Apart from Vikrant, at least half a dozen of the 18 Indian ships were due for refit in the monsoon of 1965 which has been the norm, as the rough seas during the monsoons preclude extensive maritime operations and thus provide an ideal window for maintenance.

Leaving ships under refit, the Indian Fleet comprising Mysore (Flagship), Brahmaputra, Beas, Khukri, Kirpan, Kuthar and Ranjit sailed for the Bay of Bengal in end Jun for the dual purpose of anti-submarine exercises and patrols off the A & N Islands. Accordingly, Mysore, Brahmaputra and Beas, after completion of the exercise off Madras, were deployed in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in Aug 1965 while the remaining four ships remained off Madras to continue the anti-submarine exercises.

When Pakistan launched Op Gibraltar on 05 August 1965, the resources available in Bombay were meagre. Since Pakistan was likely to extend the war to the Arabian Sea as well, the Indian Navy decided to prepare the fleet for the probable war. ‘Operation Gondola’, which authorized FOCIF to deploy ships for the protection of ports on the West coast, was ordered by Naval HQs on 13 August 1965. This operation was given effect on 01 September 1965.The frigate Talwar, which was undergoing essential maintenance, was hurriedly boxed up and sent for investigating the presence of enemy vessels in the Kori Creek, a few miles southwest of the Indo-Pak border in the Gulf of Kutch. Her first patrol was for five days from 12 to 16 August, then again from 24th to 28 August. It did not come across any Pakistani ship. Neither did it detect any suspicious activity.

Meanwhile, the FOCIF, Rear Admiral Samson and the Navy Chief, Vice Admiral BS Soman, aware of the rising tensions through the month of August prepared the fleet for operational readiness and sought permission from the political leadership to join the action and apply full force of naval power in the event of an all out war. Reluctant to escalate the conflict to maritime domain, the government of India ordered the fleet to stay in the East.

In the absence of government directives, in end Aug 1965, after completing their deployment in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Mysore, Brahmaputra and Beas proceeded to Calcutta, while the second group of ships Khukri, Kirpan, Kuthar and Ranjit continued exercising with the British submarine off Madras. The Indian Fleet was finally recalled to the west coast when the Pakistan Army crossed the international border on 01 Sep 65 as part of Op Grand Slam, and advanced towards Akhnoor. On that day, the disposition of the Navy’s forces was as follows: Mysore, Ranjit, Khukri, Kuthar and Kirpan were at Vishakapatnam; Brahamputra and Beas were at Calcutta; Talwar was on patrol off Kori Creek; Rajput, Kistna, Sutlej and Darshak and Shakti were at Bombay; Godavari and Gomti were at Cochin; two mine sweepers, Cannanore and Kakinada were at Goa; and Vikrant, Trishul, Betwa and Rana were at Bombay for scheduled refits. The Seahawk and Alize aircraft squadrons, which had disembarked Vikrant for the duration of her refit, were distributed between Jamnagar and Bombay. IAF Liberator aircraft were available for maritime reconnaissance, a role later taken over by the Navy.

Despite the government directive for a largely defensive role, the Indian Navy had chalked out a contingency plan. Intelligence on the disposition of the Pak naval forces had indicated that PNS Ghazi had sailed on 02/03 September with the Pakistani Fleet. While the fleet returned to harbor the same evening, Ghazi did not and was likely to have been deployed off Bombay for anti-shipping operations. On 05 September, FOCIF was given permission to seek and destroy Ghazi, if detected on passage. An earlier directive had permitted Indian Navy ships to attack the submarine only if detected in Indian territorial waters. As per the Navy’s assessment, the perceived threat from the Pakistani Navy was likely to be:

• Raids by Pakistani surface ships on Indian ports and merchant vessels
• Possible raids by the Indonesian Navy on the Nicobar Group of Islands
• Attacks by PNS Ghazi on Indian warships.

The Indian Navy envisaged its role to be the maritime defence of the Western and Eastern Coasts and the island territories. The tasks envisaged included disruption of Karachi Port, destruction of Pakistan Naval Forces and protection of own merchant ships in the Arabian Sea.

Meanwhile the Navy’s Seahawk aircraft, which had moved to Jamnagar on 1 September for armament workup, were placed under the operational control of the Western Air Command on 3 September. They were tasked to prepare for an air strike on the radar installation at the nearest Pakistan Air Force station at Badin. Strike on the Badin radar installation was scheduled to be launched at dawn on 7 September. All other Naval Air Squadrons were deployed for reconnaissance, anti-shipping role and for the air defence of Indian seaports.

On the evening of 6 September, however, the airfield at Jamnagar was bombed by Pakistani B 57 bombers causing damage to IAF aircraft, the air traffic control tower and the runway. The Seahawks escaped damage; strike of Badin was cancelled, and  the air defence of Bombay, which was an Air Force commitment, was entrusted to the Naval squadron.

FOCIF and major units of the Indian Fleet (Mysore, Khukri, Kuthar and Ranjit) arrived back in Bombay on the morning of 07 September 1965. However, they got breathing space of just a few hours, as Naval Headquarters informed of the likelihood of a naval raid on Bombay that night. FOCIF, embarked on Mysore, along with Rajput, Ranjit and Betwa sailed the same evening for a defensive patrol off Mumbai. Alizes were also employed for aerial patrols off Bombay. However the raid happened elsewhere. Pakistani Flotilla, disguised as merchant ships, bombarded Dwarka with about 125 shells in a sneak attack, resulting in minor damage to a railway rest room and a railway track. The Navy, meanwhile, was itching for action. The higher levels were, however, grappling with the problem of how to bring the Pakistan Flotilla to action without violating the spirit of Government’s directives. On 07 September, Naval Headquarters issued Op Directive Rebound II, which directed the Fleet to undertake offensive operations ‘as dictated by circumstances’.

Operations of the Indian Fleet were led by the Flagship, INS Mysore – a sleek cruiser powered by an 80,000 shaft horse power steam plant and good command and control facilities. Mysore’s nine 6 inch guns, controlled by fire control equipment, could deliver two and a half tonnes of explosives a minute on the target. Mysore also had eight 4 inch guns for surface and anti-aircraft operations and twelve 40 mm Bofors AA guns. Popularly referred to as the ‘Queen of the Orient’, flying the flag of Rear Admiral BA Samson, Mysore sailed for offensive patrols on the West Coast, accompanied by Brahmaputra, Beas, Betwa, Khukri, Kirpan, Kuthar, Talwar, Rana, Rajput, Ranjit and Ganga. The Fleet carried out intensive patrols and sweeps in the Arabian Sea, in conjunction with the Navy’s aircraft, throughout the duration of the war. On one occasion, the Navy’s Alize aircraft sighted two Pakistani ships 60 miles off India’s west coast. The ships of the Indian Fleet at once pursued the enemy, who without giving battle, scurried back to Karachi. For most of the duration of the war, the Pakistani Navy was ensconced in Karachi.

The Indian Navy’s anti-submarine task-force was keeping constant vigil and was particularly searching for the Pakistani submarine Ghazi, which was known to have closed to within 12 miles off Bombay harbour. On two occasions, INS Kuthar, Commanded by Commander DS Paintal, detected an underwater sonar contact of a possible submarine and launched attacks with full salvos from her anti-submarine mortars. The hide and seek went on for five continuous days and Ghazi was kept under continuous pressure, the final attack on her being launched on 23 September, shortly before the declaration of ceasefire. Because of this relentless anti-submarine action, Ghazi, could not make any impact on the war. Interestingly, on the eve of the ceasefire on 23 Sep 1965, Pakistan Radio claimed that INS Brahmaputra had been sunk in the Arabian Sea by PNS Ghazi. After the war, the Indian Navy invited the world press and Naval Attachés accredited to India, to have a cup of tea on board the Brahmaputra at the Naval Dockyard, Bombay.

The Indian Navy’s role in the 1965 war is best summarised in the words of Rear Admiral Soman, FOCIF who said after the war, “Notwithstanding our initial disadvantage of the location of the Fleet on the East Coast at the time of the commencement of the undeclared war, and the material limitations of the ships after three months of exercises away from base, the Fleet, with the help of the valiant efforts of the Dockyard, took the initiative to seek the enemy and bring him to battle. Although this was not achieved, I am sure it had placed itself in a position to contain the enemy in his waters if he had ventured out, which I know was all that was expected of the Fleet”.