As Pakistan’s offensive in J&K petered out, and 11 Corps crossed the Ichhogil, a counter attack, if any, was expected in the Khem Karan Sector. However, adequate intelligence about the Pak 1 Armoured Division in the region was not available.

As a part of the 11 Corps offensive, 4 Mountain Division was tasked to capture areas east of Ichhogil canal from Ballanwala to Theh Pannun North East of Kasur and destroy the bridge on Ichhogil on the Khemkaran – Kasur axis. The Division achieved early success on 6 September to which Pakistan reacted aggresively with armour, which was unexpected, and, it was decided to fall back and occupy a defended sector north of Khem Karan to cover axes Khem Karan – Patti and Khem Karan – Bhikiwind in the general area of Asal Uttar – Bhura Kohna – Chima Khurd.

Unknown to the defenders, Pak Army planned a bold and audacious breakout along axis Kasur – Khem Karan with 1 Armoured Division to encircle 11 Corps by capturing bridges at Harike (On road Moga – Amritsar) and Beas (On the GT Road between Jalandhar and Amritsar). Then destroy 11 Corps at will and set out for Delhi.

Two brigades of 11 Infantry Division with 5 Armoured Brigade would establish a bridgehead in area Mastgarh-Bhura Kohna and 1 Armoured Division would break out from the bridge head with:

• 3 Armoured Brigade of two armoured regiments and an infantry battalion in armoured personnel carriers astride Kasur Branch, capture Jandiala Guru on the GT road, cutting off Amritsar from the east.
• 4 Armoured Brigade of two armoured regiments and a motorised infantry battalion to advance along Kasur-Khem Karan- Valtoha -Nabipur (near Harike bridge) axis, and capture Beas on GT road and cut off 11 Corps. On the way secure Harike bridge over the Beas river.
• 5 Armoured Brigade of one armoured regiment and an infantry battalion in armoured personnel carriers to assist 11 Infantry Division in establishing the bridge head, then advance on Khem Karan-Bhikhiwind axis to protect the left flank and also isolate 7 Infantry Division.

The terrain is flat with canals and nalas running in the general direction North East to South East. Thrust lines were matched to the grain of the country and no bridging effort was anticipated. The attackers planned to reach Harike bridge by 8 September and Beas Bridge by the evening of 9 September; an audacious plan indeed.

Pakistan President Ayub Khan boasted the obsolete Indian Sherman and Centurion tanks of World War II vintage would be no match for Pakistan’s state-of- the-art American Patton tanks, and, dreamt of a blitzkrieg that would take hid forces to Delhi. His dream was however shattered and Asal Uttar in the Khem Karan sector became a graveyard of the Pattons.  The foolhardy plans had failed to take into account the inspiring leadership, bravery and resourcefulness exhibited by the outgunned Indian Army.

If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant – Sun Tzu

By morning of 8 September, elements of 4 Mountain Division had taken up defences in Asal Uttar. The area consists of well-irrigated plains crossed by many canals. The fields were full of tall sugar cane and other crops, and the plains could easily be flooded by breaching irrigation canals to render the terrain unsuitable for mechanised advance.

Deccan Horse less a squadron was deployed to deal with Pakistani tank assaults. The third squadron was protecting gun areas immediately behind the defended sector where one field regiment (25 Pounders), one medium regiment (5.5 inch guns), one light regiment (120mm mortars) and two mountain composite regiments (3.7 inch howitzers) were deployed.

2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade was in support, its 3 Cavalry had deployed behind, covering the area Chima-Dibbipura while 8 Cavalry, the second regiment, was deployed on the flanks forming a horseshoe to ambush the Pakistani tanks. In all there were three regiments of armour, one had Centurions, the second Shermans and the third AMX-13 light tanks, to deal with the Pakistani armoured division with an additional integral regiment of 11 Division; six regiments of tanks in all.

On 8 September, Pakistan carried out Recce in Force with a combat group consisting of two squadrons of Chaffee (light) tanks, a squadron of Pattons and some motorised infantry. The squadron of Deccan Horse concealed in tall sugar cane waited in anticipation. A fierce tank battle ensued and the enemy withdrew with 11 tanks lost; struck down with sniper like precision. Minor skirmishes took place throughout the day as the enemy carried out probing attacks and ran over some defended localities in its attempt to enlarge the bridgehead to launch the armoured division.

The day long armour assaults along with infantry had no worthwhile success while quite a few of their tanks were destroyed or damaged. The attack continued during the night and atleast five assaults were beaten back by the valiant 18 Rajputana Rifles supported by some very accurate Artillery fire including guns fire in the ‘direct fire’ role.

Pakistan deserves credit for audacious use of such a large number of tanks for a night assault on a battalion defended area which had mines on all important approaches. Their bravado perhaps stemmed from overconfidence in the superior weapons at their disposal or desperation to keep pace with their foolhardy plan which were torn to shreds by the defender.

Major General  Gurbaksh Singh, General Officer Commanding 4 Mountain Division ordered 2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade to deal with the Pakistani tanks which would try to bypass the defended sector by making out-flanking movements. Indian tanks were cleverly sited behind tall sugarcane so that the Pakistani tanks could not see them till it was too late.  Commander 2 Independent Armoured Brigade, Brig Theograj, issued strict instructions to his tank crews to wait until the Pakistani tanks had approached quite close to their hull-down positions before opening fire; the adage ‘shoot them when you see the white of their eyes’ describes the situation well.

On 9 September, Pakistan Air Force and Artillery tried to soften the defenders followed by tank assaults. Persistent attacks achieved no success and it was expected that having failed to over run the defended sector, Pakistan would make a final effort to break out by making outflanking thrusts on 10 September. 2 (Independent) Armoured Brigade was prepared to deal with any such thrusts and deliver the final blow.

On 10th September, the Pakistani armour and infantry attacked from the north which was repulsed after a fierce battle in which Havildar Abdul Hamid of 4 Grenadiers with his recoilless gun knocked out two Patton tanks and damaged one more. His gallantry was recognised by a posthumous award of the Param Vir Chakra.

By mid day, the combat group which was attacking 4 Grenadiers was also trying to make a northern outflanking movement; a squadron of 3 Cavalry lay in wait. As the Pakistani tanks appeared, they were hit by well camouflaged tanks which took the Pakistani combat group by complete surprise. The tanks of Deccan Horse also fired on Pakistan’s tanks from the flank as they were heading east. The Pakistani combat group was pulverized by this sledge and hammer beating.

Foiled in the northern hook, Major General Nasir the Divisional Commander tried a wider southern out-flanking move and sent 4 Armoured Brigade with 4 Cavalry in lead with a motorised infantry battalion following behind. The Centurion tanks of 3 Cavalry were ready and waiting. The Shermans of Deccan Horse also fired upon from the northern side. Some areas had also been cleverly flooded. The Pakistanis were channelized into the mouth of a semi circle with Indian tanks firing from three directions. It was an ideal trap and to complement this, the divisional artillery was ready to bring down maximum concentration of fire into this area too. The Pakistani tanks became dead ducks and a better part of 4 Cavalry regiment was shot to pieces in a boldly planned and executed ambush of their Goliaths.

Major General Nasir, who had been watching the battle from his helicopter was very disappointed. He came down and moved forward on Khem Karan-Bhikhiwind road to push his troops into a last ditch effort. He spoke to the Brigade Commander and the Commanding Officer of 4 Cavalry to bash on regardless. His radio signals were intercepted and at 6 p.m. General Nasir and his reconnaissance group came under heavy artillery fire in which Brigadier Shammi, the artillery commander of the Pakistani armoured division was killed and General Nasir wounded. With this it was curtains for the Pakistani offensive.

In the battle lasting 8 to 10 September, the pride of Pakistan’s army, their armoured division was humbled by the Indian Army. Pakistan lost 97 tanks including 72 Pattons. Indian losses were 10 tanks of Deccan Horse and only two tanks of 3 Cavalry. Lieutenant Colonel AS Vaidya, the gallant Commanding Officer of Deccan Horse which gave such excellent support to Division defended sector was decorated with the Maha Vir Chakra and so were Major General Garbaksh Singh, Brigadier Theogaraj and Lieutenant Colonel Salim Calib, Commanding Officer of 3 Cavalry. The 2 (I) Armoured Brigade had defeated a superior but clumsy opponent in the largest tank battle fought since the Second World War.

At the end of war, about 100 destroyed or damaged Pakistani tanks were collected at a place which was named ‘Patton Nagar’ (near Bhikhiwind). These tanks are now displayed as war trophies in various military cantonments.