Although the two Air forces had previously taken part in the Kashmir War in 1947, the engagement had been limited in scale. The air operations that both sides had undertaken were largely confined to interdiction and other purposes such as re-supply and troop movement. Although there had been one incident where Indian fighter aircraft intercepted a Pakistani transport aircraft, there had been no significant air-to-air combat.

During the 1965 conflict the IAF flew 3,937 sorties while the PAF flew a total of 2,364. Majority of these actions appear to be theatre and operation specific rather than being part of an overall strategic plan. As Pakistan initiated the 1965 war beginning with skirmishes in the Kutch and culminating with Op Grand Slam, Air Operations too followed similar contours with the PAF taking the initiative, confident of its newly acquired modern combat aircraft. The IAF responded in equal measure often drawing on its skills and tactical superiority to counter a modern PAF.

The aerial phase of the war began on 01 September 1965 when the Indian Air Force responded to calls for air strikes against the Pakistani offensive ‘Operation GRAND SLAM’. The IAF’s 45 Squadron which had recently been moved from Pune to Pathankot was tasked to provide air support. Three missions of four aircraft each were tasked which strafed Pakistani positions and attacked Pakistani tanks and ground targets, though minimal damage was caused to own tanks and troops in the absence of Forward Air Controllers. The Indian aircraft were intercepted by PAF F-86 Sabres. In the ensuing dogfight four IAF Vampires were lost. The ageing bombers were withdrawn from combat after this action.

Subsequently to counter the threat posed by the Sabres, Gnats were pressed into action. A combination of Mysteres and Gnats were used to challenge Sabres in air to air combat and 02 Sabres were shot on 03 Sep as part of an air operation. IAF’s Squadron Leader Trevor J Keelor of No. 23 Squadron claimed the first F-86 Sabre on that day, the first air combat victory for the IAF of the war and was awarded the Vir Chakra. Once again on 4 September, another F-86 Sabre was lost. The PAF claimed the cause to be friendly ground fire while the IAF claimed to have shot it down.

There are disputed claims about the number of aircraft shot down in various encounters. One of them relates to Pakistan’s Muhammad Mahmood Alam who is credited with shooting down of seven Indian aircraft including two as ‘probable’. Indian sources dispute PAF’s figures, attributing one of the losses to technical failure. They also claim that gun camera footage of Alam’s kills is yet to be made public and therefore the kills cannot be confirmed.

On September 6, India’s 11 Corps launched a counter offensive and crossed the border to head towards Lahore to relieve pressure on the Chamb Jaurian sector. The same evening PAF responded with attacks on Indian airfields at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara. The attack on Pathankot was successful, while the attacks on Adampur and Halwara were failures. The IAF lost almost ten aircraft on the ground at Pathankot. The Adampur strike turned back  even before reaching Adampur after being spotted by Indian Hunters flying on a different mission, while at Halwara two of the three attacking raiders were shot down for the loss of two Indian Hunters in aerial combat. Both the Indian pilots survived as they ejected over their base, whereas the intruding Pakistani pilots were killed in action. This included Squadron Leader Sarfaraz Rafiqui who had shot down two Vampires on 1 September. Before being shot down, Rafiqui is credited with shooting down the first of the Hunters. He was posthumously awarded the Sitara-e-Jurat for the Chamb action and the Hilal-i-Jurat for the Halwara action.

Another action that deserves a mention is a daring attack by Pakistan’s SSG, a para commando force which turned into a disaster due to poor planning and execution.  On 7 September 1965, the PAF para dropped 135 SSG para commandos at three Indian airfields (Halwara, Pathankot and Adampur). The daring attempt turned out to be an unmitigated disaster as only ten commandos were able to exfilterate, the rest taken as prisoners of war, including one Major Khalid Butt. At Halwara and Adampur the commandos landed in residential areas where the locals dealt with the dumb founded troops.

7 September saw the IAF mount 33 sorties against the heavily guarded PAF airfield complex at Sargodha. Two Mysteres and three Hunters were lost due to the defence mounted by the PAF’s local squadrons. One of the Indian Hunter pilots, who ejected near Sargodha, was made POW and released after the war. One of the crippled Mysteres in a heroic action got engaged in a dogfight with an F-104 Star fighter and shot each other down; the Pakistani pilot Flt Lt AH Khan ejected safely, while the Indian pilot, Squadron Leader A B Devayya, was killed. Interestingly Devayya was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra for his bravery 23 years later, after his feat was revealed by an author appointed by the PAF to write its official history of the 1965 war.

The day also saw the PAF attack IAF airfields in the Eastern Sector. As luck would have it, four battle ready Vampires waiting to raid East Pakistan were caught off guard and destroyed in the early morning raid. Two Canberras, fresh from their raids in East Pakistan too were spotted on the runway and were damaged. During the PAF’s second raid on Kalaikunda, Flight Lieutenant A T Cooke engaged four Pakistani Sabres, shooting down one while flying at tree-top height and making another a write off in the process.

The war lessened in intensity after 8 September, with occasional clashes between the IAF and the PAF. Both air forces now changed their tactics from air interdictions to ground attack and concentrated their efforts on knocking out soft skin targets and supply lines, such as wagons carrying ammunition; and armoured vehicles. On 08 September four Hunter aircraft led by Flt Lt CKK Menon were on a search and destroy mission in the Raiwind area. They spotted a goods train and attacked it. They were in return greeted by extensive ground fire from the ack ack. The whole train exploded besides blowing up the track as well. They were credited with destroying an ammunition train carrying tank shells for the Kasur – Khem Kharan sector. On 09 Sep Wg Cdr Goodman leading a Mystere strike over Raiwind spotted, a tank transporting train and destroyed and damaged around 26 tanks. In the Sialkot Sector, Flt Lt Trilochan Singh distinguished himself when he led a raid that accounted for eight tanks.

On September 13, one PAF F-86 Sabre was downed while attacking a train near Gurdaspur and the pilot was killed. In another encounter the same day between PAF Sabres from Sargodha and IAF Gnats from No 2 Squadron, an Indian Gnat was shot down by a PAF F-86 Sabre although the Indian pilot managed to eject safely. The other Gnat was also engaged and damaged in air combat. The experienced pilot somehow managed to return to base, where he later died of wounds sustained during the combat. He was said to have brought his damaged aircraft back to base and to have died during landing. Later in the night of 13/14 September, Indian Canberras undertook the deepest penetration of Pakistani airspace of the war, attacking Pakistani bases around Peshawar and Kohat. The Canberras were intercepted by a Pakistani F-104 near Lahore but they managed to evade the Star fighter and return home safely. They also had an encounter with F-86 Sabres, one of which damaged an aircraft. A Pakistani F-86 Sabre also crashed while conducting an evasive manoeuver in an attempt to escape pursuit, from an escorting Gnat as it tried to defend the Canberra bombers; the PAF pilot was killed. The Gnat pilot, W/C Singh, was later credited with an aerial victory for this incident near Amritsar. The same evening another Pakistani B-57 was shot down by anti-aircraft fire over Adampur, although both of its crew managed to eject safely and remained POWs.

On 15 September, the PAF employed a number of its Lockheed C-130 Hercules transport aircraft as bombers, which proved unsuccessful as two of them were shot down by the IAF. The following day, one IAF Hunter and a PAF F-86 Sabre were shot down over Halwara. The IAF pilot was killed in the encounter, although the Pakistani pilot ejected and spent the rest of the war as a POW. A Pakistani Cessna was also shot down that day, as well as an Auster observation aircraft. On 18 September a Sabre was shot down by a Gnat over Amritsar in a dogfight witnessed by a number of awe struck residents.  The same day a Pakistani Sabre shot down a civilian Indian aircraft even after the civilian plane indicated its identity.  Years later, the PAF pilot wrote a letter to the Indian pilot’s daughter to apologize for shooting down the aircraft.

On 19 September, a Gnat and two Sabres were downed over Chawinda. One of the Sabres that were shot down was credited to Squadron Leader Denzil Keelor, the brother of Trevor Keelor, who was credited with the first Indian aerial victory of the war.  The following day, another two Hunters and an F-86 Sabre were lost over Kasur, Pakistan.

On 21 September, IAF Canberras carried out a daring daylight strike into Pakistan against the radar complex in Badin. The raid proved to be successful. Under the command of Wing Commander Peter Wilson, six Canberras took off from Agra and proceeded towards the radar complex at low level. About 80 miles short of the target, one Canberra climbed to an altitude of 10,000 feet in order to act as a decoy, before returning to base. The other five Canberras continued on towards the target and four of the aircraft approached the target in two sections, each two minutes apart, at low level; before climbing to 7,000 feet from where they carried out bombing runs, dropping approximately 10,000 lbs of explosives. Wilson then approached from the south at an altitude of just 30 feet firing a salvo of 68mm rockets at the radar dome.

In Conclusion

It is difficult to pronounce a judgement on the outcome of an Air War as there are no tangible gains like the capture of territory. Loss of aircraft cannot be a realistic yardstick. Nor can the number of sorties flown be indicative of victory/loss. During WW II, the Allies flew way more sorties than Germany (and its allies) and also lost many more aircraft in the process. The outcome therefore has to be related to the effect that it has on the overall campaign and degradation of enemy’s war making potential. Control of air space, if achieved, could be a definite factor.

What makes it difficult to determine the outcome of the 1965 air war is the issue of aircraft lost in the air in air-to-air combat or due to ground fire as opposed to aircraft lost on the ground due to bombing. Indian sources claim that a large number of Indian aircraft losses occurred on the ground during the attacks on Kalaikkunda and Pathankot which is true and perhaps accounted for more than 50% of the casualties. But there have been conflicting claims by either side on this issue. Pakistani sources suggest that Indian losses were in the range of 60–110 and Pakistani losses were around 18–43. Indian sources claim however that in terms of aircraft lost to sorties flown, the Indian Air Force’s attrition rate (1.5%) was lower than the Pakistani attrition rate (1.82%). Independent observers state that India lost 60-70 aircraft compared to Pakistani losses of 35-45.

Much of the lessons of the 1965 war lead India to refine tactics which proved decisive in the subsequent 1971 war.

With Soviet aid, India established a modern early warning radar system. By December 1971 the IAF comprised a total of 36 squadrons (of which 10 were deployed in the Eastern sector) with some 650 combat aircraft. On the other hand the arms ban imposed by the US crippled the PAF further which had to resort to acquiring combat aircraft and Air Defence guns through their friends in the Middle East. When the moment to test the two forces arrived again in 1971, the much expanded IAF was able to prove its mettle against a determined PAF and ruled the skies for most part of the campaign, flying almost twice the number of sorties as opposed to the PAF which adopted a largely defensive posture after initial pre-emptive strikes.