Equipping the armed forces to deliver planned missions is one of the most important, challenging and complex tasks faced by Governments world over. Defence acquisitions involve programmes that are associated with high levels of uncertainty, complexity, technical risk and expenditure. Programmes can experience one or more of the challenges associated with  large investments: time and cost overruns and performance shortfall. The pork barrel spending and adoption of first past the post practice results  in scarce financial resources getting spread thinly across several schemes. This inhibits integrated capability development and filling of genuine capability gaps. The procurement of imported assault rifles, splitting the light tank requirements between DRDO and industry instead of a single whole of nation approach, release of RFIs for towed guns with a new set of QR when three options of indigenous ordnance already exist are a few examples. Unique capability requirements included in QRs stymie any plans for design optimisation which the local OEM may have. The cascading impact is the sub-optimal  performance of the platform. Arjun is a case study of how a potent platform could not take off despite it meeting most operational requirements. A systems view becomes necessary to align next generation acquisitions to consolidate existing industrial capabilities, fill in voids and and build new systems  using this foundation to achieve self reliance.

Acquisition Cycle (AC)

AC can be divided into a number of phases depending upon the source of the system; typically there are three phases in acquisition cycle–the pre-system acquisition, system acquisition and sustainment phases. Fig 1 amplifies each of these stages.

It needs to be noted that engineering sustainment is an integral part of  AC. Pre-system acquisition phase defines the need for a new equipment. The need may be based because an existing equipment is unable to perform its slated mission or a new type of mission for which an equipment does not exist in the inventory. In case of the light tank the need must start with a study of the tactical mission the tank has to undertake to effectively defeat opposing forces. It also involves identifying potential threats to its survival and mission success. In short, a comprehensive mission profile needs to be developed. The case for light tank Zorawar has gained traction after the deployment of the Chinese light tank at the LAC and experiences of deploying heavier MBTs in high altitudes. The need for light tank could be summarised as “the light tank should be able to close in and defeat opposing forces through superior application of firepower while retaining its agility and durability in the higher reaches of the Himalayas.” This mission need clearly identifies an accurate and lethal gunnery system and RAM-D as the main features to meet the likely threats at LAC.

A generally not spoken but mandatory requirement for a combat platform is its ability to operate during the combat pulse without failing. A tank or a gun  should never breakdown in the middle of a combat mission. Hence an important Key Performance Parameter (KPP) of IDDM platforms has to be RAMD.  The system acquisition phase involves prototype development and its validation and subsequent procurement. Once deployed the system is expected to meet performance requirements during training and actual combat. An issue faced during LAC like deployment is the accelerated deterioration of  equipment capability due to Age, Usage and Deployment (AUD).

Complexities of Defence Acquisitions

Defence acquisition system of most nations is a behemoth characterized by its complexity, with a myriad of stakeholders, intricate processes, and significant budgetary implications. Key complexities that shape this system can be broadly categorised as under:

             Bureaucratic Overlap involving multiple agencies with overlapping authority, creating inefficiencies. Contracting complexity makes it difficult to track costs and performance.

             Cost Overruns and Schedule Delays. Gold plating, scope creep and economic factors like inflation, exchange rate variation and supply chain disruptions impact costs and schedules.

             Technological Challenges. Rapid technological advancements make it difficult to integrate these in legacy systems and raises demand for new platforms.

             Industrial Base: Large import dependencies for assembly of local platforms creates delays and cost growth besides introducing a strategic vulnerability. Sustaining a robust defence industrial base requires careful balancing of competition and cost-effectiveness.

             Overheated Procurement Programme. By planning too many new programmes than can be paid for, efforts and finances gets dissipated without concrete results. Technology insertion in vintage platforms can address interim risks and stagger spending.

             Acquisition Reform Efforts. While various reforms have been implemented, the acquisition procedure remains complex and resistant to change. Competing interests and probity issues add to the challenge.

These complexities contribute to significant cost overruns, schedule delays, and reduced program effectiveness. Some areas requiring a refresh  are discussed below.

Defining the need

Figure 2 gives out the basic BIG 5 requirements of any complex  system like a tank, gun, ICV

From these core requirements flow out attributes  that get included in the GSQRs. It is important that if Make in India has to succeed, a tiered and incremental acquisition strategy is pursued. Else self-reliance will be notional with assembly of foreign systems. Overly prescriptive or ambitious capability requirement is one of the major reasons for the slow pace of defence acquisitions. It is destined for poor performance delivery from start. Defence capability development (CD) takes place in a highly uncertain environment with many unknowns like future operational environment, future technology landscape, competition, industrial capacity and capability. A look at QRs will reflect the practice of prescribing requirement that seeks an ambitious, ‘gold-plated’ proposal from a nascent local industry that is yet to find its bearings.

Mission Engineering

An approach called mission engineering, generally associated with space systems could be adopted for framing GSQRs. Mission engineering is the process of planning, designing, and managing a space mission to achieve specific objectives. It involves considering various factors such as :-

             Mission goals. Determining the primary purpose and objectives of the mission.

             Mission architecture. Designing the overall structure and components of the mission, including spacecraft, launch vehicle, ground systems, and operations.

             Systems engineering. Applying a systematic approach to ensure that all components of the mission work together effectively.

             Risk management. Identifying and mitigating potential risks and challenges that could affect the mission’s success.

             Cost and schedule management. Developing and adhering to a budget and timeline for the mission.

Mission engineering analyses likely missions, performance metrics including reliability and safety, evaluating design options, testing and evaluation, operations and support requirements. In essence, mission engineering is a comprehensive process that ensures a space mission is well-planned, executed, and managed to achieve its desired outcomes. Taking into account numerous challenges the Army has faced in deploying armoured vehicles in mountains be it, Zojila (1947), Chushul (1962), North Sikkim (1980s), Leh and beyond in recent years, it would be advisable to develop next generation platforms  around the operational tempos envisaged in mountains. A mission profile needs to be engineered for designing indigenous platforms. A system developed for mountains can be fielded in plains by tweaking a few technical performance measures (TPM) but the opposite may not work. The war in Ukraine has emphatically demonstrated the performance shortfalls of foreign systems. These systems simply cannot deliver operational tempos required in high altitudes. As a general rule, JVs for development of complex system  should be dissuaded through a system of weighted credits favouring IDDM efforts.

Gold Plating

Gold plating, the addition of unnecessary features to a combat system, is a persistent challenge that contributes to cost overruns and schedule delays. To mitigate this issue, several strategies can be employed:

             Clear and concise requirements definition by a detailed needs assessment, avoiding feature creep and cost and benefit analysis of each feature added.

             Robust program management by a strong project leadership, performance reviews and a strict process for approving changes to QRs.

 Independent cost estimation by employing independent cost estimators to verify cost estimates, scrutinising cost growth due to potential gold plating and a return to value engineering.

             Competitive acquisition strategies by encouraging competition, incentive based contracts and fixed price contracts.

             Acquisition reform initiatives to reduce bureaucratic hurdles, identifying and mitigating cost and schedule impacts and resorting to performance based acquisition – system capability rather than specific hardware configuration. If an indigenously developed  gun gives the desired range, accuracy and consistency without meeting some peripheral  criteria, a deviation is in order looking at life cycle readiness and  benefits that accrue to the country`s industrial base.

             Culture of cost consciousness has to sink into the military where cost control and going for local becomes an organizational culture. Institutional memory on cost estimation, value engineering and cost benefit analysis can be retained by creating a value engineering vertical in the CD directorate.

To illustrate the practice of gold plating one can refer to inclusion of  the requirement of  missile firing capability in tanks in the past decade and a half. The Army may be attempting to get a versatile platform that is capable of precision strike, increased range and firepower but concomitantly it introduces complexity, raises costs and safety concerns. The limited missile carrying capability and vulnerability to countermeasures ends up making it an exercise of diminishing returns. Besides, the present day attrition  of tanks  being carried out by the sensor-  shooter link and drones makes this capability of limited operational significance.

Requirement Drift

Requirement drift, a phenomenon where project requirements change over time, is a common challenge in defence acquisitions. In this context, it refers to the evolution of military needs, technological advancements and geopolitical shifts that can render initial requirements obsolete or inadequate. In lighter vein, it could happen whenever a new Director General assumes charge.

Key Drivers of Requirement Drift

             Technological Advancements: Rapid technological advancements can quickly outpace initial project requirements e.g. the emergence of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has significantly altered the landscape of aerial warfare, requiring new capabilities and tactics.

             Geopolitical Shifts: Changes in the global security environment can necessitate adjustments to defence requirements e.g.  the rise of non-state actors and cyber threats has led to a growing emphasis on asymmetric warfare capabilities.

             Budget Constraints: Limited defence budgets can force trade-offs between competing requirements, leading to prioritization changes and potential drift.

             External Pressures: Political influences, lobbying  can re- shape  priorities and introduce new requirements.

             Organizational Culture: Internal factors within military , such as risk aversion, siloed attitudes or resistance to change, can hinder the adaptation to evolving requirements.

The consequences of Requirement Drift are cost overruns, performance voids, acquisition delays and unwarranted proliferation of platforms ushering readiness problems. It can be mitigated and controlled by adopting  agile development  that allows for course corrections for tier 1 or mandatory  requirements.

Cost Growth

Cost growth is a perennial challenge in defence  acquisitions, often leading to delays, performance shortfalls, and public criticism. Understanding the underlying causes  are crucial to managing costs effectively. Reasons for cost growth are :-

             Requirement Creep. As projects progress, requirements can evolve or expand, leading to increased scope and costs.

             Technological Challenges. Unanticipated technical difficulties can arise during development, requiring additional resources and time to resolve.

             Supply Chain Issues. Disruptions in the supply chain, such as material shortages or quality control problems, can drive up costs.

             Economic Factors. Inflation, exchange rate fluctuations, and rising labour costs can contribute to increased project expenses.

             Program Management Inefficiencies. Poor planning, inadequate oversight, or ineffective communication/handholding by the military can lead to inefficiencies and cost overruns.

             Political Interference: Political pressures, lobbying or public opinion can influence acquisition decisions and drive up costs.

In order to control cost growth it is important to define and manage system requirements in a clear, concise manner with minimum drifts. Any new addition in the QR must be done after a cost benefit analysis to evaluate the value of the proposed changes.

Project Management (PM)

Long programme cycles, long gaps between equipment programmes, fast staff turnover results in most officers learning on the job. By the time they are able to get to grips with the complexities of acquisitions, it is time to move out. PM is an area that has a crucial impact on defence acquisition. Lack of institutional memory means that lessons from the past are not learnt. Pragmatic and tacit  knowledge transfer and sharing of experiences of past programme activities and performance could contribute to efficient management of follow-on programmes. There is a reduced incentive for officers to make decisions that might impact negatively in the short term and be detrimental to their career but deliver substantial returns over the long term.

The military has to take the lead in rigging up a multi-faceted team for various projects and whole heartedly support the development of IDDM platforms. The Project Manager has to be a team player and a team builder, creative, balanced and an integrator of multi dimensional inputs to see the project as a whole-a person with a systems view—operational, engineering and logistics view. It is through four decades of hand holding and efficient PM by IDF post Yom Kippur war that Israel today has platforms like Merkava, Namer and Athos in its inventory without any significant import dependencies. One cannot expect Indian industry to create a perfect ATHOS in the first iteration, but given a little handholding it has the abilities to create an ATHOS PLUS with capabilities which the OEM never considered.

Industrial  Capabilities 

Fig 3 shows the interdependence of acquisition and in-service sustainment phases. Supportability and RAMD parameters identified in the pre-system acquisition phase have to be built in the system during design and development and hence the sustainment phase actually starts in the pre-system acquisition phase and continues till engineering design is finalised and prototyped. The physical definition phase starts when drawings are completed and the system is actually delivered to the user. The use phase starts and continues till completion of acquisition cycle. Post acquisition the equipment starts fulfilling the need for which it was acquired. Its capability to fulfil the need is continuously evaluated and restored through in-service engineering.

A versatile defence Industrial base is indispensable for bringing in efficiencies in defence acquisitions and through life sustainment. The complexity and technology intensive nature of acquisition programmes requires appropriate industrial capabilities-design and production systems, processes, tools, materials and facilities for prototype development, testing and evaluation and eventual manufacturing. Today this capability is mainly oriented towards build to print and screw driver assembly using imported foundational systems. Take the case of K9 Vajra delivery or the order for  manufacture of 118 Arjun Mk1A. K9 is an example of screw driver assembly with a sprinkling of localised components. Arjun is yet to take off. It would worth examining to what extent these massive acquisitions  of  6000 and 7523 crores have  impacted self-reliance.

Most  defence acquisition programmes are run in a unique market set-up where military is desirous of acquiring the capability soonest and industry is keen to fulfil the need earliest ideally through an “off the shelf programme” by selling what is available globally. For genuine self-reliance,  the military has to support the creation of a local defence industrial base in its interest, as this alone can give it strategic assurance and industrial surge needed for long duration high tempo operations. IDDM acquisitions will help  create a pool of suitably qualified and experienced personnel in the area of defence manufacturing, testing and QA which will help India to compete globally in terms of costs and quality.

Conclusion

In order to optimise defence acquisitions and align it to turbo charge self reliance it is important to strategize the acquisition process, specify the roles of MOD and military along with expected outcomes so that with each acquisition, a unique industrial capability gets added to the defence industrial base(DIB) alongside operational capability and broadens it. Subsequent acquisition should as a rule be built on this capability. There are always valuable transferrable lessons that can be learnt from past programmes. Possibly, acquisition data collection and analysis could help evaluate the effects of major changes in DAP and how it has impacted self reliance. In UK, a review in 2009 revealed that close to 40% programmes cost more than the original budget and took approximately twice the estimated time.1

The GS has to understand the importance of realistic requirements setting, facilitate prototyping and sustainment from cradle to grave. Maintenance surge can mainly be provided by the military`s integral industrial base across the three services. Increased synergy at tri service level would control costs and  ramp up readiness. MOD needs to insist on a through life capability management (TLCM) plan for every complex system as an integral part of AC. It also needs to independently evaluate as to why technology refresh on a legacy platform cannot fulfil the required operational need instead of a new platform. After all, most developed nations have successfully adopted this cost effective approach. The vision of achieving technological and industrial parity with our prime adversary can come to fruition only through Indian innovation and industrial might. Every acquisition has to be strategized to add a techno-industrial capability to the country`s DIB.