In March 2025, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) gave the final go-ahead for this `7,000 crore deal, with contracts signed with Bharat Forge Ltd and Tata Advanced Systems Ltd. Bharat Forge will supply 60% of the guns, and TASL will produce the remaining 40%. The first deliveries are expected within 24 months. The Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS) represents a significant stride in India’s indigenous defence capabilities. Initiated in 2013 by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), in collaboration with Tata Advanced Systems Ltd (TASL) and Bharat Forge Ltd (BFL), the program aimed to replace the Indian Army’s older artillery with a modern 155mm gun system tailored to India’s unique operational needs. The Artillery Profile 2027 (acquisition plan) was drafted in year 2008 with an outlay of over 20,000 crore. A Field Artillery Rationalisation Plan(FARP) was proposed that comprised direct import, manufacture under license and indigenous development of weapon systems. FARP aimed to replace the weapons of  artillery regiments with modern artillery, predominantly 155mm medium guns; procuring 3,000 to 3,600 pieces of artillery to include 1,580 towed, 814 mounted, 180 self-propelled wheeled, 100 self-propelled tracked and 145 ultra-light 155mm/52 calibre artillery guns. However, budgetary constraints have impacted both acquisition of new systems and in-service support of legacy systems. The Ukraine war has reaffirmed artillery’s dominance no doubt but also highlighted the need for :-

• Mobility & survivability (avoiding counterbattery fire)
• Precision-guided munitions (reducing logistical strain)
• Drone integration (real-time targeting)
• Robust logistics (sustained fire missions)

Earlier, during the Gulf War in 1990, American artillery had significantly improved its ordnance and employment. The dual purpose improved conventional rounds which were detonated in air burst mode to bring down submunitions on armoured fighting vehicles and soldiers in open proved to be highly effective. The Persian Gulf War also saw a historic first time use in combat of an artillery round named FASCAM (field artillery family of scatterable mines) in combat during the Battle of Khafaji as also the introduction of Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) and the M712 Copperhead  PGM. Post Kargil the Indian Army too experimented with the Russian Krasnopol laser guided munition but it did not find much favour despite it proven effectiveness in open terrain. The spectacular display of mission effectiveness of the sensor shooter kill chain in Op Sindoor, in which targets were identified in depth and munitions guided on to them with precision, has once again raised questions on the relevance of mass based old fashioned offensives. The AI kill chain has repeatedly proved its ability to disrupt the conventional battlefield using the system power of precise, smart and intelligent systems that can be cheaply manufactured in big numbers, possibly at the price lower than a dumb artillery shell and many times lower than the cost of fire and forget ATGMs. The future battlefield saturated with thousands of drones, calls for a revisit of the two decade old Artillery`s modernisation programme, that remains focussed on procurement of large numbers of traditional platforms.

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine, which escalated significantly with Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, has seen an unprecedented expenditure of artillery ammunition by both sides. Tube artillery, including howitzers like the M777, 2A65 “Msta-B,” and CAESAR has been a decisive factor in the Ukraine war. The extensive use of artillery has also led to the devastation of towns and cities, particularly in eastern Ukraine.

Effective Use of Tube Artillery

1. Precision Strikes with Western Systems. Ukraine effectively employed NATO-standard artillery (M777, CAESAR, PzH 2000) with advanced targeting systems (Excalibur rounds, drone corrections).
2. Counterbattery Warfare. Both sides prioritized employment of counterbattery radars (AN/TPQ-36, Zoopark-1M) to detect and neutralize enemy artillery.
3. Massed Fires in Defensive Operations. Russia initially relied on Soviet-style mass artillery barrages (e.g., siege of Mariupol, Bakhmut), while Ukraine used artillery units to sustain prolonged defence.
4. Drone-Directed Artillery. UAVs (e.g., DJI Mavic, Bayraktar TB2) provided real-time targeting, drastically improving accuracy.

Expenditure of Artillery Ammunition

1. Scale of Usage. Both sides have fired tens of thousands of artillery shells daily at the height of the conflict. For example, in mid-2023, it was reported that Russian forces were firing an estimated 20,000–60,000 shells per day, while Ukrainian forces were firing around 5,000–7,000 shells per day, depending on availability.
2. Types of Ammunition: Includes 152mm and 155mm shells, the most commonly used calibres by Russian and NATO-standard artillery systems, respectively. For rocket artillery systems like the Russian BM-21 Grad, BM-27 Uragan, and BM-30 Smerch, as well as the US supplied HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System), were used extensively.
3. Logistical Challenges. Ukraine has faced challenges in maintaining its artillery ammunition supply due to limited domestic production capacity. Russia, while having a larger domestic production capacity, has also faced shortages and has reportedly sought ammunition from allies.

Major Lessons Learned

• Survivability Depends on Mobility & Dispersion. Self-propelled guns (CAESAR, Krab) and shoot-and-scoot tactics proved essential. Tactical mobility is much more than driving on rough terrain is about using the terrain and the environment to aid survivability of platform and the crew.
• Close Engineering Support. It is time the Indian military recognises the criticality of combat force regeneration. At the heart of the artillery system is the gun which must provide a ready, robust, resilient platform that is consistent and accurate, permits firing even when primary systems malfunction and enables quick restoration and repair on site to return to full mission capability. Forward repairs can ramp up pulse availability of platforms and help sustain fire support as demonstrated in Ukraine. (Fig 1)
• Logistics and Ammunition Supply Are Critical. Russia’s initial artillery dominance waned due to ammunition shortages. Ukraine faced similar challenges before Western aid (155mm shell shortages in 2023). Ammunition re-supply vehicles can no longer be road only commercial trucks.
• Counterbattery Tech is a Game-Changer. Modern radars and electronic warfare (EW) systems power to rain down precision fires on platforms has forced artillery to evolve or be destroyed in the initial stages of combat. The battle of beams that can be brought to bear by PLA could greatly inhibit systems power of artillery platforms and bring down “steel rain“ from adversary`s PGMs after the first salvo.
• Artillery Must Integrate with Other Arms. Successful Ukrainian offensives (e.g., Kherson, Kharkiv) saw artillery integrate with missiles ,  drones, and infantry and hence matching mobility is essential. The long tractor trailer combination is unviable in the modern battlefield.

The conflict has set a new standard for artillery warfare, emphasising smart over dumb and static. The widespread and effective use of First-Person View (FPV) drones in Ukraine-particularly for precision strikes against tanks, artillery, and armoured vehicles has  raise questions about the continued relevance of tube artillery  in future conflicts.

However, while drones are transforming warfare, artillery remains indispensable but must adapt to survive and remain effective. For several decades our capability development has focussed primarily on the threat from the Western borders. With the unprecedented force built up along the LAC, it is time that this one size fits all approach still evident in our capability development programmes is reviewed. The approach that what works in deserts and plains will also work in mountains stands demolished with the kind of equipment issues emerging from the Himalayas. In addition, the fact that Chinese weapon platforms are increasing finding favour with the Pak military and the willingness of the northern adversary to readily accede to such requests to enable operational test bedding of its platform, should constrain the Indian military to carry out a review of its CD programmes.

Artillery in Mountainous Terrain: A Mixed Bag

Towed artillery systems. While offering significant firepower, face unique challenges in mountainous terrain. Steep inclines, narrow roads, and off-road conditions can severely limit the movement of towed guns. Their reliance on external transport (trucks or tractors) can be a major bottleneck in mountainous regions. Finding suitable firing positions with adequate dispersion and concealment can be difficult in mountainous terrain. The terrain itself can also obstruct line of sight, limiting effective targeting. The advantages are that  towed artillery still provides substantial firepower, particularly with modern ammunition types. Towed artillery systems are generally less expensive to acquire and maintain than self-propelled options. The need therefore is to employing specialized towing vehicles with enhanced off-road capabilities.

Mounted Gun Systems (MGS). Offer greater mobility and can quickly change position while  providing rapid and sustained firepower. Large size and weight can restrict access in narrow mountain passes and steep inclines. They are more susceptible to enemy fire due to larger profile and more expensive to acquire and maintain. Here again technology can reduce the bulk of towed mounted artillery by using soft recoil techniques and developing a modern, light weight 105 mm gun system for close fire support; direct and indirect.

A 105 mm MGS configured with an innovative mobility system using a hybrid electric drive, can be perform the dual role of a tank destroyer and artillery gun leading to closer integration of arty into the battle groups. Ukrainian CAESAR and Krab howitzers have survived longer than Russian towed guns due to rapid displacement. Tracked self propelled guns (2S19 Msta-S) perform better in mud/snow than wheeled or towed systems.

Ammunition. The impact of a rarified atmosphere on range and accuracy is significant: Rarified air, with lower air density, offers less resistance to the projectile’s flight. This translates to increased range as the projectile can travel further due to less drag. The projectile’s trajectory becomes more elongated, leading to a flatter flight path. Rarified air has a lower capacity to stabilize the projectile’s flight. Lower temperatures in high-altitude environments can affect the projectile’s initial velocity and flight characteristics. Reduced humidity can also impact projectile flight, though to a lesser extent than air density. All these will have an impact on ammunition consumption (Fig2) for desired effect on target. Incorporating meteorological data and sophisticated ballistic calculations into fire control systems can help compensate for the effects of rarified air.

Gun Designer`s Dilemma

The choice between towed artillery and mounted gun systems (MGS) in mountainous areas depends on specific operational requirements and the nature of terrain. But certainly heavy gun systems lacking agility and offering larger footprints may not survive the first engagement, leaving infantry extremely vulnerable. The user has been demanding over the years  artillery platforms that provides self  sufficiency in performing  operational tasks, continually requesting improved platforms with greater ballistic, mobility, survivability, availability, and logistic performance to counter opposing  threats and meet new doctrine and force requirements.

The designer`s dilemma is what to do with recoil; how to handle recoil as available options to configure modern recoil systems are constrained by laws and limits of Newtonian physics. The applied force resulting from firing the weapon have to be balanced by the resulting weapon static and inertial reactions. There is a limit to the minimum system weight for a given input energy. The required structure to accommodate these loads needs a minimum weight based on material used  and deflection requirements. Added together, the recoiling and non-recoiling structural mass will set a minimum system weight. This has been a bone of contention in ATAGs too. A pragmatic process to follow could be:

o             Avoid gold plating in user’s requirements and goals; no copying of attributes from foreign platforms.

o             Setting priorities; primary requirement(s) and secondary requirements.

o             Focus on meeting the primary requirement(s) and optimizing secondary requirements.

o             Evaluating system performance/characteristics on key performance and key sustainability parameters.

o             Refine/rework/accept/reject the design or adjust the requirements.

Rejecting or cancelling the project in favour of any imported platform should be a last resort only in cases where troop safety is involved. Shortfalls in range, rate of fire, weight can be overlooked in favour of accuracy, consistency, survivability, system durability and strategic assurance indigenous systems offer. It is critical that rather than demanding more range out of the platforms which would drastically impact reliability, maintainability and hence readiness rates, the Indian military looks towards advancements in ammunition for greater military effectiveness.

Viability of Tube Artillery  Amidst  Rise of FPV Drones

The advent of drone warfare has increased vulnerability to drone strikes as FPV drones can loiter, detect, and strike artillery positions with high precision. Russian and Ukrainian forces have lost hundreds of towed and self-propelled guns to drone attacks. This calls for better camouflage, electronic warfare (EW) protection, and frequent repositioning (“shoot-and-scoot”) capabilities. Counterbattery threats are  enhanced by drones as they provide real-time targeting data, making artillery more detectable and vulnerable to counterfire. Traditional   massed artillery fires (as used by Russia early in the war) are now riskier. Logistics and Ammunition Depots are prone to drone surveillance and targeting as FPV and reconnaissance drones track supply routes, making artillery resupply more difficult.

To remain viable, future artillery systems must adapt and incorporate enhanced mobility & automation (MGS/Self-propelled guns (e.g., Krab, CAESAR) as towed guns are too slow to escape drone strikes. Autonomous artillery systems with robotic loaders and automated firing solutions could reduce exposure. Active protection & EW countermeasures need to be inbuilt like drone jammers e.g., Russian “Stupor,” Ukrainian “Pokrova”) to disrupt FPV drone signals. Hard-kill systems comprising anti-drone guns, microwave weapons need to be deployed alongside artillery positions. In addition, Networked & Dispersed Firing Solutions need to be developed as next generation ACCCS to enable decentralised operations and avoiding large detectable concentration of platforms. The concept of swarm artillery tactics entailing multiple small units coordinating fire via drones and AI has to be put in place to ensure a fail safe sensor shooter link.

The war in Ukraine has accelerated advancements in artillery ammunition, with a focus on greater precision, extended range, smarter fuses, and novel energetics to counter modern threats like drones and electronic warfare. To outmatch enemy counterbattery systems, major militaries are developing shells with significantly increased range using base bleed (M549A1, ERFB-BB) and rocket assisted projectiles (M549, M795E1) to extend range in the 40 to 70 km region enabling strikes behind enemy lines. In future using ramjet propulsion (air breathing propulsion) ranges of 100 km plus appear feasible (DARPA`s Gunslinger and BAE`s Ramjet 155mm). To reduce logistic strain smart shells are becoming wide spread like the Excalibur, Bonus II and Krasnopol M2 (Figs 3&4). Excalibur has been highly effective against Russian command posts and lumbering artillery. Even dumb shells are acquiring near PGM capability using new fuses. In short, future of artillery ammunition is based on longer ranges, more precision, smarter fuses, safer energetics and drone integration.

ATAGS Development

The development of the ATAGS is a significant achievement for India’s defence sector, demonstrating its capability to design, develop, and manufacture advanced artillery systems. The gun’s superior range, rate of fire, and autonomous features will substantially boost the Indian Army’s firepower and operational readiness, particularly along its challenging borders. The international interest further underscores the ATAGS’s potential as a world-class artillery system and a key contributor to India’s defence exports. While the project faced some delays, its successful development and impending induction mark a major milestone in the modernisation of the Indian Army’s artillery and pursuit of Atmanirbharta. It is now for the Indian military to facilitate acquiring of full system maturity soonest by providing realistic inputs on faults and breakdowns so as to enable it surpass the record established by the Soviet 122mm field guns. In “Soviet Field Artillery in World War II” by Michael Foedrowitz, it is stated that one of the most successful Soviet guns (serial No 2464) was a 1938 model 122mm field gun which fired a total of 6541 shells covering a distance of 4605 kms from Moscow to the Baltic coast. Its successor the D-30 of 1960 design is still being used in Ukraine! This is the gold standard for RAM-D parameters to be achieved for ATAGS using the intellectual firepower of Indians.

Tube Artillery`s Future: Tech Forward Concept

On a final note, it is evident that tube artillery is still viable though it needs to evolve to a tech forward orientation. The key takeaway appears to be that for peer conflicts (China-Pak) agile mounted gun systems could dominate while for low-intensity warfare towed guns could be still useful. The Ukraine war has proven that artillery remains an indispensable cornerstone of the battlefield, but only if it evolves with smarter, longer-range, and more versatile ammunition. The future will see autonomous, networked, and hyper-precise artillery systems dominating the fight, while traditional “dumb shells” fade into a supporting role.