Warfare is changing rapidly across the globe. From Ukraine’s deep drone strikes into Russia to Israel’s surgical attacks on Iran, and the brief but intense India–Pakistan flare-up in May, a new pattern is emerging. Precision, technology, and unmanned systems are increasingly shaping the battlefield pointing to a future of contactless conflict.

Conflict has been raging in different parts of the world for years now. The Russia-Ukraine War is in its fourth year and the turmoil in the Middle East has been going on for three. To add to this, a four-day exchange of fire took place between India and Pakistan between 7- 10 May, which was fortuitously curbed in time.

In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Ukraine hit 5 Russian airbases – some 6000 kilometres deep, in an audacious drone attack that crippled almost a third of its strategic bomber fleet. In the Middle East, while the relentless pummelling of Gaza continues, Israel attacked Iran, striking with deadly precision at its leadership and nuclear facilities, followed by a coup de grace by US B 2 Stealth bombers.  What has emerged is a greater emphasis on technology, long-range precision engagements and increasing use of drones and unmanned platforms. This technologically driven, non-contact form of warfare could well become the norm for the future.

OP SINDOOR and its Aftermath

During the 88-hour India-Pakistan conflict between 7-10 May there was little physical fighting, barring a few skirmishes along the LOC. But the scope of conflict extended across the entire western borders and deep into each other’s territory.  India struck terrorist camps over a hundred kilometres deep without its aircraft even entering enemy airspace. Air and ground launched missile strikes hit terrorist camps, air bases, radar and Air Defence sites with pin-point precision – all from their own territory. Aerial dogfights took place with aircraft engaging each other with Beyond Visual Range missiles, fired over a hundred kilometres away. In some cases, the missiles were homed onto their targets through satellite guidance – obviating the use of the aircraft’s own radars and pre-empting detection.

Both sides used drones on an unprecedented scale. Pakistan used swarms of up to 500 drones, mixing sophisticated armed drones with hordes of cheap expendable ones, to enable them to get through to the targets. It is to the credit of the Indian air defence, that a large number were detected and shot down – more often than not, with legacy guns, and not the more expensive AD missiles.  India’s use of drones was perhaps more innovative and effective.  Drones designed to mimic aircraft signatures forced enemy air defence radars to open up. Other loitering drones homed on to the radar signals and smashed into them. This tactic has been credited with neutralising at least one HQ-9 air defence radar at Lahore, and crippling half a dozen other targets.

For the first time, both India and Pakistan fired long range cruise and ballistic missiles into each other’s territory, with one Pakistani Fatah II missile intercepted as deep as Sirsa – ostensibly headed for Delhi.  And on the final night of the war, India launched an intensive drone and missile strike that hit 11 Pakistani air bases and radar sites. This strike inflicted more damage on Sargodha, Nur Khan, Bholari, Rahimyar Khan and Murid air bases than the combined damage caused to them by repeated air attacks in the 1965 and 1971 wars.

Although both sides mobilised their forces, there was no actual combat between troops of either side. The navy too, though poised to strike, did not come to play. Most of the engagements were through long-range attacks launched from within own territory. This in itself, has inherent dangers. It reduces the risks to pilots and human lives, which paradoxically could lower the threshold for conflict, while increasing the physical damage that can be imposed. And in a nuclear-armed neighbourhood, missiles flying across each other’s air space, could lead to a dangerous miscalculation, and escalate beyond the point of no return. The extensive use of technology, and the integration of ‘kill-chains’ – using platforms, radars, surveillance and guidance means, including satellites – also brings a different dimension to air combat.

‘OP SPIDERWEB’ and the Russia-Ukraine War

After almost four years of war, the Russia-Ukraine war had reached an impasse of sorts.  Ground action were limited to engagements in the Donbas where the Russians were slowly advancing, and in Kursk where the last remnants of the Ukrainian offensive had been gradually eliminated. Yet, what marked this stage of war was the vicious missile and drone attacks on each other’s cities and infrastructure. Kyiv was especially targeted and was subjected to attacks virtually every week. Perhaps the attacks were designed to break the opponent’s will to continue what has now become a pointless war. But even this long-range war, suddenly took a turn when Ukraine launched an audacious drone attack in a covert operation that hit five airbases deep in Russian territory.

Ukraine had built up a fleet of 117 First Person View drones, hidden in Russia over 18 months. These were concealed in crates and then hidden in barns and remote farmhouses. The crates were then transported by container trucks towards their targeted locations. Commercial trucks were used and, in most cases, the drivers did not even know what they were carrying. Five airbases were targeted   – Belaya, over 4000 kms from the Ukrainian frontier; Olenya, near the Arctic Circle; Ivanevo and Ryazan in Western Russia; and Amur in Siberia – over 4300 kms apart and extending over three time zones.

At 1205 hours on 01 June, the operatives gave the remote signal, activated by mobiles and using the local cellular networks. The top of the crates slid open and the drones were activated. Subsequent video footage showed drones flying out of the trucks, hovering briefly and then speeding off towards their targets. Each of the drones was controlled by individual pilots, operators who had been planted in Russia months before with one reportedly staying just a few hundred yards from the headquarters of FSB, Russia’s internal intelligence agency. These operators guided the FPV drones using fibre optic guidance which could not be jammed or detected. The drones were flown towards the targets at low altitudes to avoid detection. Artificial intelligence enabled the cameras in the drones to identify the bombers parked on the runway or in their hangars, and guided them to their most vulnerable parts – fuel tanks, engines and weapon systems. Ukraine claimed that 41 strategic bombers were destroyed including crucial TU-22 and TU-95 bombers and A-10 surveillance aircraft, though the actual figure was around 20 aircraft. But this low-cost strike inflicted over $7 Billion of damage, caused tremendous loss of face and brought the war deep into Russia.

The attack though devastating has not changed the course of the war. If anything, it has hardened the Russian stance. Their offensive in the Donbas has intensified, but the ground war has become a brutal slugging match marked by the ubiquitous drones flying overhead. More than that, drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian towns have increased, with attacks virtually every day.  Even as the ground war slows, this long-range battle marks a dangerous escalation to the war, which makes termination even more difficult.

The Israel-US-Iran Tangle

Even as Israel continues its relentless pummelling of Gaza, it has ingeniously eliminated its enemies in a series of covert and overt actions. It crippled the senior and middle level leadership of the Hezbollah through exploding pagers, an action which has to rank as amongst the most brilliant covert operations in history. The Hezbollah leadership had realised that the Israelis could identify the location of their operatives through their mobile signals, and thus switched to low-tech pagers and walkie-talkies. The Hezbollah order for 3000 pagers was executed by a Budapest based company which was actually an Israeli front which had been set up much earlier. The pagers, laced with 2-3 grams of explosives detonated at 3.30 pm  on 17 September 24.  Over 1600 Hezbollah operatives received a message on their pagers from Hassan Nasrallah himself which exploded when they tried to answer it. A similar detonation injured another 1400 operatives the next day.

Israel eliminated the head of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh in a similar covert operation. Haniyeh was a regular visitor to Teheran, where he was always housed in his preferred suite in the Government Guest house. During renovation, explosives were surreptitiously placed in the walls and cabinets of the suite. When he arrived for his next visit, the explosives were detonated remotely, killing him instantly. While one may question the ethics of these actions, their efficacy in eliminating terrorist leaders is something that can be considered against our own enemies.

With most of Iran’s proxies having been eliminated, the Israeli’s attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities was very much on the cards. Israeli jets stuck just after midnight on the night of 13 June, using a package of over 200 aircraft to strike 100 targets deep within Iran.  The attack damaged some of Iran’s most important nuclear installations, missile sites, production facilities and military bases and virtually decapitated their military, political and scientific leadership.

Israel had already mapped out the weaknesses of Iranian air defences by earlier strikes, and exploited them. Their aircraft penetrated deep into Iran hitting Natanz, “the beating heart of the Iranian nuclear program,” and the nuclear sites at Parchin, Isfahan, Bushehr and the heavy water plant at Arak. Fordow, Iran’s most vital nuclear site which contains the centrifuges essential to create weapon grade Uranium was also attacked. But the plant was located almost half a mile deep in the mountains near Qom, and required GBU– 57 Massive Ordinance Penetrators dropped by US B2 Bombers to deliver the coup de grace, two weeks later.

Purely from a military viewpoint, the attack was indeed quite ingenuously executed.  Mossad operatives had infiltrated deep into Iran with drones and high precision munitions, and were in position in the vicinity of Iranian missile sites and Air Defence systems. When Iranian AD radars and missiles opened up to engage the Israeli aircraft, they were attacked from the ground with drones and missiles, compounding the effect. In fact, many of the missiles were targeted as they were being transported from storage sites to launch areas, thus degrading the Iranian response.

The Impact on Warfare

OPERATION SINDOOR has provide some pointers of the manner of contemporary conflict. Taken in conjunction with the lessons of other wars across the world,  it could help in preparing for the future.

The role of armour and infantry is often questioned in this new form of warfare. But it must be remembered that all the territorial gains made during the Russia-Ukraine war by both sides have been by ground forces. They will always remain essential to hold and capture ground. With India’s long unsettled borders and adversaries on both flanks, they would always have a pre-dominant role to play. But, the efficacy of these arms has to be enhanced by greater networking, situational awareness and the infusion of force multipliers.

Drones and unmanned vehicles have significantly changed the way armies wage war now. In the Russia-Ukraine war, over 70% of all tank and vehicle casualties and 50% of personnel casualties have been attributed to drones, far more than artillery, mortars, mines and small arms fire. They have been used down to squad levels for surveillance and early warning, reconnaissance and even leading the advance of armoured and infantry columns. They have been used to lay minefields, and even clear them, along with other diverse roles such as providing local cellular connectivity, to serve as decoys, and even as anti-drone systems. Armies need to revise their tactics to use them effectively and still take counter-measures against enemy drones. The battlefield has become far more transparent with the omnipresent drones overhead and would require doctrinal and organisational changes right from squad level upwards to operate in this environment.

The use of unmanned vehicles and long-range precision munitions have impacted all domains including Air and Sea. Ukraine, which does not possess a single functional warship, still managed to sink the flagship of the Russian Black Sea fleet – MOSKVA – using long range Neptune anti-ship missiles fired from land.  They also destroyed eleven large naval vessels and attacked the port of Sevastopol using explosive laden unmanned surface vessels that rammed on to the ships, with guidance being provided by FPV drones hovering overhead. With the development of long-range precision munitions, the efficacy of large warships and aircraft carriers has reduced considerably.  Chinese DF 21 and DF 26 “Carrier-Killer” missiles pose a threat to US aircraft carriers over 2000 kms away. A single strike by a low-cost missile on a high value target like a warship could change naval equations dramatically. Investing in unmanned surface vessels and submarines could provide more-bang-for-the-buck. The Air Force too, can incorporate drones even more, using ‘motherships’ to launch swarms of drones from our own territory to strike at targets deep in enemy land.

While state-sponsored terrorism remains India’s greatest threat, we could take a leaf out of the Israeli playbook by pre-emptively eliminating terrorists on enemy soil through covert action. Innovative measures can be thought of as on the lines of their exploding pagers. ‘Unknown assailants’ killing wanted terrorists hiding in enemy soil always gives a deep sense of vindication. The local cellular networks can be infiltrated to eavesdrop on conversations and home on to mobile signals of the terrorists and their handlers. Ingenious methods can be utilised such as replacing the walking stick of a wanted terrorist by one fitted with a GPS chip to enable subsequent targeting. Pills can be replaced by cyanide. Known safe houses can be sabotaged to detonate remotely at the right time. These are no longer the stuff of spy fiction, but can be actively practised as actions which fall in the ambit of national security.

The fear is that this same technology and methods could be used by terrorists and their sponsors against India, even in peace time.

Today’s wars are not won on the ground or in the air.  They are also won on media channels and social media networks. Winning the war of perception and shaping the narrative, (which was lost in OP SINDOOR) is as essential as winning the actual war. Besides the meagre resources of ADGPI, professional PR agencies, media outlets, computer experts and psychologists can be incorporated to shape and disseminate our message globally.

The technology-oriented and non-contact manner of contemporary conflicts has actually raised the dangers.  The threshold for war has now been lowered since human lives are not so much at risk. But the conflict zone has increased manifold, to include civilian targets and depth areas. This manner of conflict, could unfortunately become a norm. To counter it, we have to make organisational, doctrinal and equipment changes rapidly to prepare for coming conflicts, which unfortunately seem quite close to the horizon.