Pakistan’s New Guided Rocket and Its Regional Impact

Pakistan’s Fatah-II guided rocket marks a significant step in regional strike capabilities. As a two-tube, 600 mm-class mobile rocket (on an 8×8 TEL) equipped with modern INS/GNSS guidance and terminal seeker, Fatah-II can launch 365 kg blast/fragmentation warheads with high precision. It accelerates into supersonic cruise (roughly Mach 2–3), similar to Western GMLRS and ATACMS rockets, giving it very little flight time. Importantly, Pakistan’s designers aimed for a “quite flat” (low-altitude) trajectory. By flying near terrain, the rocket remains under radar horizons until moments before impact – a so-called “kryptonite” profile that sharply shortens reaction time. In practice, a Fatah-II covering the last 100 km at Mach 2–3 could leave defenders only 30–60 seconds to detect and launch interceptors. This combination of speed, stealthy flight, and in-flight guidance makes Fatah-II a potent long-range artillery-rocket.

Technical Highlights and Battlefield Role

Technically, Fatah-II builds on earlier systems (its Fatah-I predecessor had 8 tubes of 300 mm rockets with ~140 km range) to push Pakistan’s reach into the “hundreds of kilometers” regime. With its large two-rocket launcher, each salvo can pack a heavy payload. The warhead’s 365 kg of explosives and fragmentation is among the largest in guided MLRS, intended to destroy fixed targets or armor over a wide area. Accuracy is claimed to be within tens of meters (some reports say CEP ≲10 m, manufacturer estimates ≲ 50 m at max range). In effect, Fatah-II can strike precise points – supply depots, airfields, command bunkers, far beyond Pakistan’s conventional artillery range. Against troop formations or static defenses, even a few such rockets can force disruptions or force movement of assets.

Strategically, Fatah-II blurs lines between artillery, missile and air attack. It combines the mobility and salvo effect of rocket artillery with satellite-guided precision more like a cruise missile. In the recent 2025 Indo-Pak conflict, for example, Pakistan’s use of precision rocket barrages underscored this shift: relatively inexpensive rockets penetrated deep into Indian rear areas, challenging air defences and prompting high alert and dispersion of forces.

Unique Flight Profile (“Kryptonite” Trajectory)

A defining feature of Fatah-II is its flight profile. Unlike high-arching ballistic missiles, it flies almost horizontally after burnout. Designers highlight that it stays at low altitude – “under the radar horizon” – as long as possible. For example, a ~300–400 km-range rocket at Mach 2–3 covers the last 100 km in under a minute. This severely compresses the interception window. Fatah-II’s “kryptonite” trajectory (as one analyst put it) is akin to a stealthy strike: fast, low, and hard to spot.

In-flight corrections further enhance its threat. The rocket’s guidance combines INS and multi-constellation GNSS (GPS/GLONASS) to update its course throughout flight. It reportedly also carries a terminal seeker (electro-optical or radar) to adjust final aim. In practice this means Fatah-II can even alter targeting late in flight, countering simple “predict and intercept” tactics.

Regional Strategic Implications

For South Asia, the advent of Fatah-II carries clear doctrinal significance. The system can threaten India’s rear-area infrastructure (e.g. logistics bases, missile storages, critical airfields) from beyond Pakistan’s border artillery fire. This forces India to adapt its posture. Pakistani military doctrine, influenced by Cold Start concepts, emphasises rapid offensives backed by heavy rocket barrages. Fatah-II neatly fits this scenario by providing a long-range precision punch that can precede or accompany an advance.

Guided rockets like Fatah-II are relatively cheap compared to large ballistic or cruise missiles. Israeli experience showed that tens of thousands of inexpensive rockets can impose psychological and logistical pressure. Fatah-II multiplies this effect: Pakistan can lob precision-guided salvos where each shot is far more lethal. The expense asymmetry is striking – as one analyst notes, even high-end interceptors (>$100,000 each) face hordes of cheap rockets. In sum, Fatah-II raises the “quantum” of artillery war in South Asia.

Lessons from Recent Conflicts

Global conflicts have already yielded valuable lessons on these guided-rockets. In Ukraine, for instance, Russian forces have relied on mass rocket barrages (BM-30 Smerch, Uragan, etc.), while Ukraine responded with Western MLRS (HIMARS/GMLRS) and layered air defenses. A key lesson was integration: Ukrainian NASAMS batteries once intercepted 75 incoming missiles with 100% reported success when properly networked.

In Gaza/Israel, the Houthis and Hamas routinely fired thousands of unguided rockets. Israel’s multi-tier defense (Iron Dome short-range, David’s Sling/Patriot medium-range) reportedly shot down ~85–90% of rockets aimed at cities. However, attackers offset this with saturation attacks and mobile launchers/tunnels. Efficient short-range interceptors (Iron Dome) can greatly reduce damage if sufficient batteries are deployed.

The Nagorno-Karabakh (2020) conflict offers a cautionary tale: Azerbaijan combined modern guided rockets (Turkish TRG-300, Polonez MLRS) and drones (Bayraktar TB2) against Armenian forces with mostly Soviet-era SAMs (Osa, Kub, Strela). Armenia suffered heavily. Guided rockets – some with ranges up to 270 km (Israeli LORA) – struck Armenian armour and even destroyed an S-300 site. Drones first neutralized SAM radars, then rockets hammered exposed targets. Thius, outdated air defences can be overwhelmed by a combined arms approach.

Confronting Fatah-II requires a layered AD approach. At the strategic end, high-altitude SAMs (Patriot, Russian S-400) could intercept rockets if they climb high enough. In practice, their radars (tuned for aircraft/ballistic) may struggle to spot a low-flying Mach 2 rocket against ground clutter. Mid-tier SAMs (NASAMS, Barak-8, Akash-NG) have faster reaction but shorter range (~25–100 km). They rely on early warning; if a Fatah-II is only detected near ground level, even NASAMS might not react in time. Crucially, short-range “point” defenses are needed; systems like Israel’s Iron Dome or Russia’s Pantsir/S-1 can engage incoming rockets at very close range.

India’s Evolving Countermeasures. India, facing its own Fatah-II threat across a tense border, has accelerated upgrades. The Indian Air Force and Army are building overlapping radars (3D ground radars, L-band long-range arrays, naval Swordfish/AESA, AWACS) specifically tuned to catch low-flying rockets. The new Swathi Weapon-Locating Radar can spot incoming rockets out to ~80 km, and ‘Akash-proof’ radars on airbases scan low elevations. On the EW front, DRDO programs like Samyukta, D-4 and Shakti are meant to jam missile guidance and pick up signals, complementing older jammers on aircraft and UAVs. Even simple IR/EO scouts (drones with cameras) help cue fire-control.

India’s shooters follow the multi-tier model. At the lowest level, quick-react guns (modernized Bofors L/70, and emerging laser systems) form a close-in defense. Short- and medium-range SAMs cover the mid-altitudes: the new Akash-NG missile (70–80 km range) and the indigenous QRSAM (25–30 km) bridge the gap. India’s planners explicitly stress that no single system must bear the whole burden – if one layer misses, another should catch the threat. (As India’s DGMO colorfully put it, using a cricket analogy: “if Lillee don’t get there, then Thomson surely must” – meaning one fast bowler off the other end!)

Conclusion. Fatah-II exemplifies a trend. Battlefield rocket artillery is becoming precise, long-ranged, and hard to stop. In South Asia’s delicate balance, it forces both sides to rethink air defense and offense doctrines. Lessons from Ukraine, Gaza, and Nagorno-Karabakh show that layered sensors, aggressive EW, and integrated shoot-down networks are vital, but alone may not suffice against massed saturation attacks. Ultimately, countering systems like Fatah-II will demand not just new radars and missiles, but also creative tactics, deception, rapid counter-battery, and resilient deployment.