The hijacking of the Jaffar Express by Baloch fighters spotlighted Pakistan’s festering internal crises. Rising insurgencies in Balochistan and Waziristan, coupled with economic chaos, political repression, and Islamist extremism, signal deepening instability—with serious regional and nuclear security implications for India. Meanwhile, political turbulence in Bangladesh and rising anti-India sentiment threaten to unsettle India’s eastern flank if left unchecked.

When freedom fighters of the Baloch Liberation Army hijacked the Jaffar Express near the famed Bolan Pass in the rugged mount the Baluchistan, it marked a significant escalation of the Baloch freedom struggle. It also marked a major signpost for Pakistan in its increasing travails. The train hijack ended 48 hours later with all 33 terrorists reportedly killed by the army, 21 hostages killed and the remaining rescued by the Army. The Baloch version was significantly different. It claimed that the hostages had been released by them and not rescued by the army. (As corroborated by the freed hostages later) and that the army had suffered much higher casualties. But more than the casualties, the event brought the Baloch movement to centerstage, and highlighted a struggle that has going on for over 70 years now.

Baluchistan and Waziristan – Getting out of Control

The Baloch independence issue has been festering since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, when Pakistan coerced the Khan of Kalat into joining Pakistan, instead of remaining independent. Since then, the province – which comprises of 44% of its land mass but less than 8% of its population – has been systematically exploited for its gas, minerals and natural resources, getting little in return. Baloch resentment has spilled over in four insurgencies – the first in 1948 and again in 1958-59. A major insurgency surged in 1973 in which the Pakistani army used gunships and fighter aircraft to flatten entire villages. But the movement really erupted in 2006,  when Nawab Akbar Bugti, a respected Baloch leader was assassinated on the orders of Parvez Musharraf, triggering a wave of violence that continues to this day.

China’s CPEC, and the construction of Gwadar  port and road running through Baluchistan, Punjab and into the Xinjiang Province of China was another sore point. The locals did not receive any of the promised largesse, which were siphoned off by the Chinese and the Punjabi elite. The resentment against the project led to a series of attacks on Chinese personal. Suicide bombers struck vehicles carrying Chinese engineers, Chinese workers were attacked, the Pearl Continental Hotel at Gwadar, which housed Chinese officials was hit by a bomb, and symbols of Chinese presence were systematically targeted. What makes this movement different is that many of the freedom fighters – especially the suicide bombers – are well educated young men and women, who clearly and articulately bring out the legitimate demands of the Baloch people and the exploitation they have been subjected to. As the movement gains ground, Pakistan could be headed for another 1971 – only they refuse to see it.

To compound the actions in Baluchistan, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, (TTP) has upped the ante in Waziristan, attacking security forces along the length of the remote province. TTP fighters strike at will and then slip across the Durand Line into Afghanistan, where they are given support and often covering fire, by their Taliban brethren. (A dramatic reversal from the days when Taliban fighters crossed the line from Pakistan for strikes on US forces in Afghanistan, and then slipped back to their sanctuaries in Pakistan again). The actions of the TTP are undoubtedly coordinated by the Taliban regime in Kabul, who do not recognise the Durand Line (which they call the Hypothetical Line) and make no bones of the fact that they want to extend their version of Sharia into Pakistan as well. That would be the long-term goal, and in conjunction with the actions of the Islamic State of Khorasan, Al-Qaeda and other Islamist groups, Pakistan has seen virtually an attack every day. In 2024 alone there were over 55o attacks that claimed over 1600 lives – and this year threatens to be worse.

The Divisions Within

In spite of the chaos all around, the army still clings on to its self-appointed role as the custodian of the nation – in every field from security, foreign affairs, economy and politics. After the rampage against the army in May 2023, Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf party (PTI) has been banned and he himself continues to languish in jail, along with most of its top leaders. Yet, the crackdown did not prevent the PTI candidates from winning 101 seats out of 266 in the national elections, standing as independents. The elections of February 2024, brought in another ‘selected’ government in to power – that of Shehbaz Sharif – but has done little to alleviate the economic and social situation. Inflation is rampant at 29%, and onions sell for over PKR 250/a kilo while petrol costs around 280/ a litre. Sectarian violence is on the rise with increasing Shia- Sunni attacks on each other’s mosques. The fissures within the country are growing and it is even reflecting on the army.

Former chiefs – including much respected ones, such as General Jehangir Karamat – have come out openly against the present Army Chief General Asim Munir’s dangerous policies to keep the army in control at all cost. A letter has emerged, purportedly written by junior and mid-level Army officers, warning General Munir about the dangerous consequences of the Army’s interference in national politics, and the state of the nation. There is already a divide between the army and the government and it will impact its ability to counter the growing insurgencies in Baluchistan and Waziristan. They would need to deploy a growing number of troops just to keep it in check, which will tie down the army considerably for some time to come. In spite of their anti-India rants, it is the Indian border which is its most peaceful now. But illogically, they could just re-activate this border, and step-up actions in Kashmir to raise the India bogie, divert its people, and project the Army as the sole saviour of Pakistan, once again.

The instability of Pakistan ties them internally and prevents them from causing mischief elsewhere.  But it is cause for concern. Even now the army is strong enough to control the situation in Baluchistan and Waziristan, but it calls for a political solution and not harsh repressive measures that the Army usually follows. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism especially in the lower strata of society, also raises fears of the same instability creeping towards India. And the possibility of Pakistan’s nuclear assets falling into the wrong hands is definitely cause for concern. To make things worse, its all-weather friend China, is slowly distancing itself from it, even reducing CPEC investments. Its favourite frenemy USA, has discarded it after the Afghan war and has cut-off aid and support. But they would both be mindful of the growing instability in the nuclear-armed country and not want it to disintegrate completely.

India needs to watch the developments on our Western flank with care. But it is up to Pakistan itself to salvage its own situation. There has to be give-and-take in Baluchistan with greater autonomy and fair allotment of resources. The TTP has to be completely removed – militarily if required – as that is Pakistan’s long-term existentialist threat. And the divisions in civil society have to be bridged. For that, the army and the political leadership have to be on the same page. This implies that the army has to stop its continual interference in politics and let genuine democracy flourish – even if it means the return of their beta noir Imran Khan. And above all, the nation needs to realise that the policy of hostility with India leads nowhere. It has to be replaced by one of good neighbourly relations, if not friendship. How they implement these fundamental changes could well determine the future of Pakistan.

Bangladesh on the Boil

On India’s Eastern flank, Bangladesh is facing the same turmoil as its one-time conjoined twin. Ever since the protests of April 24 – now euphemistically called “The Movement” – removed Shaikh Hasina’s autocratic government and forced her to flee to India, the nation has been in the state of churn. Nobel Laurette Mohammed Yunus took over as the head of an interim government – but they are fast learning that overthrowing a government is easier than running one.

Law and order have broken down completely, attacks on minorities and Awami League members have increased, and the once thriving economy has collapsed. Even within the interim government, differences have emerged between the factions. The firebrand student leader Nahid Islam, who was one of the architects of the movement, pulled out of the interim government to form his own party, the National Citizens Party. In this environment of drift, the Army Chief, General Waker uz Zaman, issued a stern warning to the students and politicians stating that their actions, “lead the country to chaos” and they should not force him “to do what I don’t want to do.” This has led to fears of a military coup, especially as APCs and military jeeps began intensified patrolling along the streets of Dhaka.

So far, the Army has maintained that it will not get involved, but Bangladesh has a history of military takeovers. Like their Pakistani counter paths, the Army would not want to be held responsible for the running of a dysfunctional country and would rather leave it to an elected government. The interim government has promised to hold elections by end 2025, and perhaps the army would rather ensure that it takes place on schedule, so that some semblance of governance is in place.

What has been unsettling, is the rise of rabid anti-India sentiment, something which our intelligence agencies failed to gauge correctly. The sentiment stems from the fact that Sheikh Hasina’s policies have been projected as, “Pro-Indian, which sold the country,” and her subsequent refuge in India. But it is deeper than that. India is held responsible for virtually all the ills in Bangladesh – whether it is floods, drop in groundwater levels, crop failures or losses to the garment industry, or even cricketing defeats. Sheikh Hasina’s balanced policies kept anti-India elements in check – especially the radical Islamist groups like the Jamat-e-Islami. These groups are rampant once again and actively supporting Khaleda Zia’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (which had proved itself to be equally anti-India in their earlier terms). The greatest fear is that Bangladesh could fall into the hands of the Islamists, who could come into political power in a coalition government. That will pose a security problem along the entire 4098 kilometres of border with an unstable Bangladesh.

So far, the Indian stance is that it is up to Bangladesh to determine the trajectory of the relationship.  India should just wait and watch till the present sentiment subsides and realpolitik takes over. After all, Bangladesh needs India in everything from electrical supply, river waters, markets, investments, technology and infrastructure. A healthy relationship is essential to their economic growth – which had hit an impressive 8.3% with Sheikh Hasina’s “anti-national policies.” India needs a stable, friendly Bangladesh on its eastern flank, which could help provide connectivity to South East Asia, and also keep fundamentalism at bay. In the present climate, Bangladesh is likely to lean towards China, which is another worry. But they too, are aware of the dangers of a Chinese debt trap. The adverse impact of Chinese investments in Pakistan and Sri Lanka are clear indicators of the dangers of the China embrace.

A lot will depend on the Bangladesh elections, which could take place by the end of the year. At the moment the star of the BNP – supported by the Jamaat e Islami is on the ascendency, and the Awami League on the back foot. But after the turmoil of the past year, it is likely that the Awami League could resurface. The Supreme Court has declared that it cannot be banned or barred from contesting the upcoming elections. It could return to power under a new face, maybe Hasina’s son, Sajeeb Wazed, who is more acceptable across the board. That would help put Indo-Bangla relations back on an even keel. But should the BNP, propped by the Jamaat-e Islami, come to political power, relations could be more delicate.

Bangladesh has tried to erase its very history and relationship with India, but as with Pakistan, it should realise that geography cannot be wished away. Good relations with India would be mutually beneficial and ease much of its economic, political and social travails. It could also provide India with a stable neighbour on its Eastern flank. And that stability – on both flanks – is essential for India, if it is to take its rightful place in the region.