The operation (GIBRALTAR) itself may have been bold and audacious in its planning but immature and unprofessional in execution, which resulted in needlessly sacrificing hundreds of Pakistani soldiers, who remain unsung and unheralded. – Sultan M Hali,Pakistan Air Force Veteran, now a journalist.

In 1965 Pakistan drew up an audacious plan to infiltrate Jammu and Kashmir to induce insurgency and destabilize the region. Operation Gibraltar was launched in August 1965, Pakistan Army soldiers of the Special Services Group (SSG) Mujahids and Razakars, disguised as locals entered the state. So brazen was the plot that every infiltrating commando was given two rifles and additional ammunition; one to fight with and the second to be distributed to locals to fan a “massive indigenous war against Indian occupation”. The infiltrators were grouped into 10 forces, each comprising of six units of five companies. Each force was commanded by a Pakistani Army Major and allotted a code name. Sadly for them the fairy tale strategy went terribly wrong; Kashmiris did not cooperate as anticipated and thousands of infiltrators were trapped by the Indian forces and annihilated.

This article draws on the statements of Pakistani historians who rue the agonizing demise of the brazen plans.

General Mohammed Ayub Khan, sent the commandos into India after being fed apparently ‘doctored reports’ that the valley’s Kashmiri population was ready to revolt against ‘Indian occupation’. But this never happened, and the commandos ended up getting trapped in the region after the Indian Army cut off their escape routes, leading Islamabad to broaden the war front- Gohar Ayub Khan, Ayub Khan’s son and Pak politician.

I frankly told General Akhtar Malik (General Officer Commanding 12 Division) that the Operation (Gibraltar) was a non-starter and that I would render the same advice to the Chief and Vice Chief of General Staff. At GHQ, the same day I briefed the Chief and Vice Chief, who listened to me patiently. The result of my presentation however was barren of the result. Major General Malik Sher Bahadur (The Chief), posed only one question. “You (Mehdi) say that operation Gibraltar as planned stands no chance of succeeding, but Akhtar Malik feels confident of its success.” My reply to the Chief was that, the conflicting view point of Mehdi and Akhtar Malik notwithstanding, as Chief of General Staff of Pakistan Army, he should also have an opinion on this important matter as we were not playing a peace time war game, but with the destiny of Pakistan itself. To this date I remember the reaction of the Chief. He went red right up to his ears, and after a painful pause got up, extended his hand to shake and brought the interview to an end with the remarks that, “It is always interesting to listen to you!!” – Col SG Mehdi, MC commanded Pakistan’s SSG till just before the 1965 war. He was removed for questioning the idea of Op Gibraltar which according to him was foolhardy.

Infiltration commenced on 5 August. Initially, about 1,500 infiltrators crossed over in small batches and concentrated at selected points. The second batch of infiltrators was pushed in the third week of August and comprised 6,000 infiltrators. By the first week of September, there was another group ready for induction but could not be sent due to counter-offensive by the Indian Army.

Some infiltrators were spotted by local herdsmen who reported them to the security forces. Immediate counter operations were launched and they were captured, liquidated or ex-filtrated,  broken and demoralised. Within a week, Operation Gibraltar had collapsed; it was an unmitigated disaster.

Unfortunately, we could not create the situation in the valley as we expected. We could not win the confidence of the local people – Brig Ishaq, Second in Command, Gibraltar Force

Fed up with Pakistan’s repeated violation of the cease fire line, the Indian PM Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri decided to take the fight to the enemy camp by crossing the ceasefire line. Pakistan never expected such belligerency. The plan involved capturing critical areas in Haji Pir, the Kishanganga Bulge and Kargil heights to contain and prevent further infiltration.

Pt 13620 (altitude in feet) in the Kargil Heights dominates Kargil town and the Srinagar–Leh road and is the key to its safety from Pakistani guns. Also, Indian Artillery observers on Pt 13,620 can watch deep into Pakistan and target its areas and infiltration routes. 17 PUNJAB launched a three directional attack on the treacherous and heavily mined slopes with three platoons each supported by Artillery fire, Medium Machine Gun Section and an Engineers detachment for mine clearing. Complete radio silence and surprise was maintained resulting in the capture of the heights on 15 August; an Independence Day gift to the nation.

The battle of the Kishanganga Bulge in the Tithwal sector involved securing a number of tactically important and dominating features across the Cease Fire Line. It began on 23 August with the capture of Ring Contour by a combined patrol of 2 RAJPUT and 3/8 GORKHA Rifles who withstood heavy artillery bombardment throughout the night. On 24 August, 1 SIKH surprised the enemy and captured Richhmar Ridge killing eight defenders and capturing a large amount of arms and ammunition which they later used against the enemy. The Sikhs then proceeded to attack the formidable Pir Sahiba feature on the night of 25/26 August which was captured after a stiff fight. Capture of these areas enabled the units to dominate infiltration routes. On the night of 3/4 September, 3/8 GORKHA Rifles captured the Sunjoi feature after a stiff hand to hand fight with heavy casualties to the enemy. The Pakistanis counter-attacked twice unsuccessfully. With the capture of Sunjoi, Indian troops reached the outskirts of Mirpur, close to Muzaffarabad, enabling them to dominate the whole area east of the Kishanganga River. The final objective in this sector was Point 9013, which was captured by 4 KUMAON, with the support of massive artillery firepower.

The iconic Hajipir Pass pass ignites great passion and fervor in the minds of every soldier, both Indian and Pakistani (they lost it and we captured it, only to return it during the Tashkent Agreement in a diplomatic faux pas). It is located at an altitude of 2,637 metres (8,652 feet)) in the formidable Pir Panjal range in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir astride the old Poonch – Uri road (Both in India). The pass itself is dominated by three hill features namely Bedori (3760 metres) in the East, Sank (2895 metres) in the West and Lediwali Gali (3140 metres) in the North West. All of these features combined form a salient into the Indian Territory, known as the Hajipir Bulge. The Hajipir Bulge offers many infiltration routes into the Kashmir valley and the Poonch-Rajouri sector with Hajipir Pass providing a vital logistic base and staging area.

68 Infantry Brigade was tasked to capture the pass, D Day was fixed as 25 Aug but had to be postponed to 26 Aug due to bad weather. The operation involved a two pronged attack with Western and Eastern approaches (1 PARACHUTE Regiment and 19 PUNJAB Regiment).

The pass was finally captured on 28 Aug 1965 at 1000 hrs in broad day light. A detailed account follows.