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Learning from US Armoured Fleet Modernisation: Insights for India’s Efforts

Sub Title : There are lessons to be learnt by the Indian Army from the US Army’s experience which has been through the cycles of modernisation for its own fleet

Issues Details : Vol 18 Issue 3 Jul – Aug 2024

Author : Lt Gen Sanjay Verma (retd)

Page No. : 27

Category : Military Affairs

: July 29, 2024

The US Army’s attempts at replacing its fleet of armoured vehicles, particularly the BMPs and tanks, have been far more structured and ambitious compared to the Indian Army’s efforts. Learning from the U.S. experience, especially as detailed in the Congressional Research Service report of July 2021, could significantly benefit India’s modernization programme. This article was first published in part in Dec 2021 and remains relevant even today

The Indian Army’s aborted attempts for finding a replacement for the BMPs and tanks, with whatever intent and vigour they were taken up with, are nowhere near to the attempts made by the US Army to replace its fleet. It would therefore be prudent to learn from their experience to put on track our modernization program. Salient aspects of  the US experience are comprehensively and exhaustively covered in the updated Congressional Research Service report of July 2021.

The mainstays of the US Army have been the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the M-1 Abrams Main Battle Tank, inducted in early 1980s and the Armoured Multi-Purpose Vehicle M-11. Prior to the program to develop the New Generation Combat Vehicle, which was launched  in 2018, there were two previous efforts to modernize these combat vehicles.

Year 2000 to 2009. The first was the Future Combat Systems Program, which ran from 2000-2009 and included a family of light and mobile crewed and autonomous vehicles. Envisioned as a family of network manned and unmanned vehicles as well as aircraft for the future battlefield, it was cancelled by the Secretary of Defence in 2009 because of overly ambitious requirements, failure of development of key critical technologies, frequently changing requirements from the Army leadership and schedule delays and a complicated industry led management approach resulting into cost over runs.

Year 2010 to 2014. The next attempt was in the form of a Ground Combat Vehicle Program which ran from 2010-2014 focusing on the replacement primarily for the Bradley but being relevant across the entire spectrum of Army operations incorporating lessons learnt in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite a tight watch on acquisition strategies, platform capabilities, operational needs, cost efficiency and technological specifications the program was forced to be terminated in Feb 2014, being infeasible.

Post the above two programs being aborted the focus shifted to upgrading existing platforms as opposed to developing new systems. This was a result of combination of budgetary constraints as well as user ambivalence. As these vehicles had, over a period of time, already undergone numerous upgrades there were increasing constraints on further ability to upgrade. Delays in modernisation were also being  adversely commented upon by all concerned. This led to the launch of the New Generation Combat Vehicle Program in 2018. This was a deliberate effort based on lessons learnt and after identifying core priorities rather than being overly ambitious. It had a well-defined constitution of eight cross functional teams under the Modernisation Task force for establishing the Army Futures Command to consolidate the entire modernization process. The intention was to leverage expertise from Industry and Academia, identify ways to progress various prototype development options and demonstrations thereof and identify opportunities to expedite the complete acquisition process from development to roll out.

Based on the above the New Generation Combat Vehicle Program soon transformed into the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle Program and added more platforms – five in all- for development in a defined and timebound manner. These are the following: –

  • Replacement for M-2 Bradley – Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle.
  • Replacement for M-113 Vehicle – Armoured Multi-Purpose Vehicle.
  • Replacement for M-1 Abrams Tank – Decisive Lethality Platform.
  • Light Tank – Mobile Protected Firepower.
  • Three versions Light, Medium and Heavy of Robotic Combat Vehicle.

Surprisingly, this program, which had unfolded in 2018 went through a period of uncertainty wherein the RFP issued in Mar 2019 had to be withdrawn and another one issued in July 2020. The reasons  for the same are  relevant in our context too and bring forth certain important lessons. The notable ones are: –

  • The operational requirements were  characterised as aggressive with prototypes expected to be fielded in an unrealistic or unrealizable time frame of 2026 by the Army, the Industry did not support this idea.
  • Need felt  to redraw the operational requirements to integrate relevant, critical but yet to mature technologies
  • Army’s intention to award contracts to a single vendor. Out of a  list of five to seven vendors expected to participate only three participated and ultimately only one was left in the fray. The acquisition strategy needed refinement.
  • Acquisition strategy redrawn to shift the initial cost burden to the Army with an aim to motivate more vendors and regain Industry trust.
  • A sequential plan to commence with the digital prototype, preliminary design, detailed design, prototype building and testing and production and fielding to ensure success.
  • Significant and again relevant – reduction of foreign barriers to competition since certain proven technologies on OEM platforms existing beyond the US shores needed to be integrated to fit into both cost and time estimates.

The program has now rolled out with clear directions in terms of decision-making authorities, stakeholders, requirements, specifications, deliverables, budget and timelines and is termed as a unique approach to system development particularly in terms of system specifications and requirements.

Way Ahead for Indian Army Modernisation

There are important lessons and takeaways  from the US experience. The start point is that there has to be clear intent and directions both from the user and the decision maker. There is a need to cut across stakeholders and out of the box thinking which looks beyond and not remain confined to the standard acquisition procedures.

The salient aspects of this thought process should become the pillar of the modernisation endeavour and evolve into an acquisition strategy. Significantly the following aspects merit analysis: –

Family of Platforms Concept. The existing concept of looking at each platform separately  needs to be broadened to include a family of platforms. This is essential not only from evolving and standardizing operational and critical requirements but also from the viewpoint of inter-operability, augmenting and complimenting individual platform capabilities, developing common technologies, evolving a uniform logistics and sustenance philosophy besides many other advantages. The platforms which need to be developed are: –

  • Future Ready Combat Vehicle.
  • Future Infantry Combat Vehicle.
  • Light Tank.
  • Wheeled Armoured Personnel Carrier.
  • Recce & Support Vehicle.
  • Unmanned Ground Vehicle.
  • Employment Philosophy. This needs to be evolved basis perceived and emerging threats and adversary capabilities. All stakeholders be it the line directorates, Military Operations or Operational Commands need to converge in this regard. This will dictate structures and organization for employment of these platforms and also bring about clarity in the need of equipping various combat forces.
  • Qualitative Requirements. The US experience amply brings out the pitfalls in the form of ambitious parameters, changing requirements, technology immaturity and development timelines which are not realistic. This is something which sounds more than familiar and hence a very pragmatic and cautious approach needs to be adopted. The onus is not that of user alone but all stakeholders including R&D, Industry and Academia to be truthful and candid in spelling out the requirements keeping critical capability gaps and corresponding maturity timelines in mind. An integration plan to adopt and upgrade technologies as they mature should be factored in with defined deliverables. Defining the need of compatible munitions and drones across all platforms is another feature. Similarity and inter-operability of fire control, communication and guidance systems to name a few besides development of common philosophy power trains, suspension, transmission protection and other such systems has to be the norm. Combination of weapon systems and lethality to complement the capabilities is another important factor.
  • Logistics and Sustenance Framework. The requirement for such heavy platforms needs to be evolved on a womb to tomb concept and also the life cycle costs of acquisition. With a family being thought of, commonality of inventory, support infrastructure, maintenance philosophy and other supporting platforms for say Artillery, Engineers, Air Defence, AMC, EME have to be factored in this acquisition strategy.

In Conclusion

There is an urgent need to work out the basic requirement of the family concept of platforms and operational requirements. Factors such as Optional Manning, Capacity, Transportability, Protection, Lethality, Mobility, Inter-Operability, Sustainability with emerging technologies such as Active Protection, Artificial Intelligence, Directed Energy Weapons, Advance Target Sensors, Loitering Munitions and Onboard Drones need to be deliberated and finalised.

A calibrated approach while developing and refining the acquisition strategy would be to work collaboratively on a preliminary design graduating to a detailed design leading to prototype building and testing and ultimate production. At the same time the trust of the Industry has to be maintained during  the development phase with appropriate hand holding and assuring them that they will not be given a short shrift.

Clarity of the requirements, timelines, a mechanism to execute, clear road map to be followed, maintaining  enthusiasm of participating industries, budgetary support for the phased program and a very strong oversight mechanism are required. It is also to be clearly understood that it is not possible for any single organization to drive this and at the same time the existing diffused structure is just not capable of undertaking the endeavour. It will also be necessary to break the boundaries and confines of the existing procedures as given in DAP 2020 and some out of box thinking is required  to seriously drive the mission. Therefore, a national project on the lines what has done the country proud viz the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program should be replicated and initiated as Integrated Armoured and Mechanized Platforms Development Program with all stakeholders under a unique umbrella so that the coming decades see an indigenous, formidable and credible capability build-up of the Indian Army.