Interestingly, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), Gen Anil Chauhan, in a podcast on the MoD’s website alluded to a couple of joint doctrines under development as part of the campaign and initiative – ‘Year of Reforms, 2025’, undertaken by the Raksha Mantri. If there has been a weakness in the Indian Armed Forces and more in the Indian Army it has been the evolution of doctrines and their reduction to written form. We therefore need some explanations on doctrine and perhaps even a debate on how these should be produced, reviewed and executed.

What is a Doctrine?

A straight pick up from the internet reveals the definition of military doctrine as – “a formal document that outlines how military forces should operate in a given situation. It’s a collection of principles, best practices, and experience that guide military operations”.  That is just half the explanation. The most important aspect of a military doctrine is that it should be a guideline that sets up your understanding of doable objectives and aims, tailor the required capability in terms of resources, human and material, get a measure of the degree and type of training needed and assist you to work out a plan to apply the resources in a realistic timeframe to expect the desired results. A basic principle in the formulation of a doctrine is flexibility. The content should be broad enough to absorb different scenarios and eschew any fixations or sermonized ways of achieving an intent. Many times, they have to be robust enough to withstand the domination of powerful military personalities who by dint of personality wish to override the contents of doctrines, although flexibility is invariably built into these.

A nation really good at putting down everything in the form of doctrines is the US. Doctrine there includes Army Doctrine Publications (ADPs), Field Manuals (FM), and Army Techniques Publications (ATP), all composed and written in the classic guideline pattern. These publications cover “conduct of operations”, or how missions are planned, prepared, executed, and assessed in practice. US Army regulations and pamphlets provide guidance and policy for administrative themes too. The emphasis is a lot on operational and training literature which helps guide personnel on expectations and ways of conduct.

The Indian Army and Military Doctrines

The Indian Army has its own system of General Staff publications, pamphlets of schools of instruction and training notes that each Field Command and Corps issues. A debate continues whether these are sufficient to act as doctrines at appropriate levels. General Staff publications are the source from where most of us who apply our minds to thinking on military affairs gained our knowledge and information. However, looking back this may never have been sufficient for the vast majority. It was often said that a General Staff publication read at various stages of your career, at different ranks, evoked somewhat different perceptions of how operations should be thought through. I continue to believe that these publications were simply outstanding but were not easily interpreted without guidance. Perhaps we need fresh thinking on this through a debate and need to decide what needs to be ‘doctrinalized’, how the contents have to be framed and what levels of leadership have to be targeted.

Military Campaign Experience is a Major Advantage

Among contemporary armies of the world, institutionally the Indian Army is one of those that has fought successful conventional wars (1971), faced hung situations in the form of stalemates (1965), suffered defeats and withdrawn after losing territory (1962), fought militants and terrorists in campaigns of different intensity, conducted out of area operations (Op Pawan 1987-90), launched expeditionary surgical special operations (Operation Savage in Maldives 1988) and participated in operations with the United Nations in all forms, from peacekeeping to peace enforcing. It’s one of the rare armies which holds fixed posts and picquets at heights of 22000 feet above sea level in glaciated terrain and in intense sub-zero temperatures. To top it, it is ever ready to participate in internal security duties involving other than counter terrorist responsibilities. Recently the Army Chief has even taken on the onerous responsibility of letting the Army be the first responder when natural and manmade disasters strike at the Himalayan borders, without awaiting any requisition from civil authorities. The rich spectrum of experience and the continuous increase in responsibilities combined with the rapidly changing nature of war and infusion of new and highly complex technologies into the military domain, only demands that we can never be static in thinking. We need to trigger military minds ever so often to innovate, falling back on the rich experience and lessons learnt. This is where doctrines make the difference. A set of well thought out guidelines laying out the basics and more, as per identified need. If available every few years, it takes care of the dynamic change which is taking place in warfare at all times. The joint nature of a majority of these doctrines is mandatory but individual service related doctrines are also necessary.

Any army is driven by the nature of personality of its senior commanders. There may be brilliant strategists who have failed in ground application, or the finest ground commanders who have never been able to grasp the strategic connotations of force application. An army must therefore never have to suffer intervals in intellectual thought processes. The system should be so institutionalized that doctrinal thinking and its reduction to paper must remain a continuum. Otherwise, severe breaks in military intellect take place and generations are often deprived of the correct thought processes which need to be imbibed as they mature to higher ranks. Besides the senior leadership, the junior leadership has little to fall back upon to bridge the tactical to the operational and the operational-strategic levels which it must start to comprehend early in service without the cynicism of being ‘over interested’. Professional evolution takes place from early years and it’s a misnomer that lower levels must not be exposed to an overkill of doctrinal guidance in their formative years who according to flawed thought processes are meant only for ground orientation and knowledge.

The Idea

The CDS has given an impetus by revealing that doctrinal aspects are at last receiving due attention and a plethora of doctrines on various themes of modern warfare are under formulation. The themes, although not difficult to identify, also need a debate from time to time. The CDS explained that doctrines on multi-domain operations (MDO), helicopter and heliborne operations, network centric warfare, joint communications, space-based operations and conventional missile forces are all under formulation. Lethal autonomous systems too, form a part of this with a cyber operations related doctrine already released in 2024.

Reducing doctrines to writing is an art. It’s like camouflage and concealment; too much detail and too little are both flawed. A continuous debate should now examine the frequency, the level and the degree of detail with which doctrines should be written. It is also pertinent to examine for whom the doctrines should be written; the ultimate clientele and   who should do this?

There are different ways by which written doctrines can be produced. In the past some outstanding doctrines were produced based upon lessons learnt. Perhaps two of the finest, but related primarily to operational-tactical application, were the ‘Nodal Point Concept’ of General K Sunderji and the ‘Ditch cum Bund (DCB) concept’ adopted from the lessons of the war of 1971. These remained limited to the Field Army level (Command) level for long before finally emerging as Army level doctrines. In junior ranks I always knew that the Indian Army’s concept was limited war and we always spoke of counter offensive but never a pro-active offensive. It changed quite dramatically after 2001 when proactive strategy became a byword. The guidelines for proactive strategy have remained diffused. Some may argue and for good measure that diffused doctrinal thoughts too are good as they retain greater flexibility and do not create mindsets. However, this also creates a lack of clarity at almost stages of command with personalities feigning extra awareness or the complete lack of it.

We did not have a HQ ARTRAC in the Seventies and the Eighties. Those were the crucial years after the eventful conventional operational experience that we had gained. It was the Army War College (in its avatar as the College of Combat) that did the honours of reducing some of that experience to writing. Today, we have the benefit of robust faculties in all Category A training establishments, besides the HQ ARTRAC itself. But looking well beyond are the various military think tanks set up for this very purpose; research work and evolution of fresh thinking. These must not be reduced to geopolitical research work only. There are also private think tanks galore, some underwritten by corporates who wish to be a part of the defence intellectual community. As the defence industry in India grows, its expansion into investment in private think tanks will be needed much more. This is where some outstanding research work, combining the strategic environment with evolving and tested technologies, existing and required operational tactical concepts and the application of forces can all be examined threadbare and doctrines evolved.

Will These Become Outsourced Doctrines ?

Not the least and there are many reasons for that belief. The Army has limited time and resources to invest in serious research. The dissertation research at the various long courses notwithstanding, not much of the research is captured for effect. An intellectually richer eco-system needs to evolve, with researchers and technologists with operationally oriented minds and several consultants fresh from the field whose intellectual wares will then have to be integrated both for technological and doctrinal content. That is when the ecosystem will start to mature.

The eternal crib in the Army is the number of overworked and overloaded staff officers who do staff work, coordination, research work and paper production. Can this ambit increase to absorb several young veterans (without the label of rank) who remain current for five to ten years, post superannuation, have a technical and strategic orientation and can give the experience of a lifetime back to the system by research and conceptual output. This should ultimately emerge in the form of doctrines on a much-expanded spectrum of facets of warfighting or related military activities.

What are the Fields Begging Doctrinal Research in the Indian Army?

We need not apply our minds to the specific subjects and themes because these will evolve themselves as the eco-system expands and the necessity of doctrines is felt. The CDS has already outlined many of these which are under formulation. The aspects we could look at, and these are not final by any count, may be some of the following: –

Strategic Environment. To have any sense of strategic balance to evolve doctrinal aspects for a strategy or a concept there needs to be clarity about the nature of the future strategic environment; from there emerge threats. Aspects such as understanding asymmetry, technical superiority, broad order of battle, force dynamics in terms of technologies and capability of sustaining of war effort at different pitch levels, has all to be put down. This can run into theses but must be very broad and give an idea of the type of adversary and the nature of war he could be involved with.

Capability. Any army needs basic guidance on what capability it should aspire for, considering the nature of national financial management, budgeting system, availability of resources and resource acquisition system.

             Human Resources. This cannot be ignored and needs to be based on the education base and the need for fair distribution of recruitment. At the officer level this is the most ignored aspect with little effort to find solutions. The Indian Army has continued to remain at a high level of officer deficiency for various reasons with none really treating this as a virtual emergency.

             Nature of Primary Doctrine. As mentioned earlier, post 2001 the Army switched to proactive strategy from its defensive and counter offensive based doctrine, as far as the western adversary is concerned. At all times a realistic assessment needs to be made of this keeping national aim in mind. All-out war, notwithstanding, we would need to retain capability of limited surgical wars, as per terrain, adversary and situation. The primary doctrine will dictate capability to a great extent.

             Current and Emerging Technologies. Their currency of employment and the dynamic nature of development will always demand the need for doctrine for best exploitation. Fortunately, much is already developing in this field but the ecosystem can always absorb more, taking care that it does not create confusion among the clientele. Clarity for high average minds is what ensures workable doctrines.

             Contentious Technology and Equipment. There will always be some equipment considered outdated while the Army remains hugely invested in it. As an emerging economy our nation cannot afford a discard policy which declares obsolete that which was frontline just a short while ago. Thus, a synthesis of the future, the current and some of the past is always in service and the Army knows how to optimise its usage. The application of this needs the right thinking. The tank and the ICV will remain in service and new ones will continue to replace the old even as they are being written off as discards in the minds of modern-day commanders. Optimisation will need to be the watchword in our doctrines.

             Training and Intellectual Development. One of the greatest challenges for any modern army. How much to train, who to train and with what content to train. These must be the guiding factors. We all agree that an overtrained army is counterproductive as is the concept of training a few gladiators. General standards of training have to be raised and multi-skilled soldiers have to be produced. An infantry soldier should be able to fire every single infantry weapon and use every piece of equipment likely to be in his immediate vicinity. A major doctrinal change in training will be necessary especially with the Agniveer system of recruitment. Progressive military education (PME) of officers also needs a reorientation every few years as generational change occurs.

             Logistics. If there is anything which makes me really proud is the method by which the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force carried out the logistics build up of Ladakh in 2020. Not much is known about this. Logistics doctrines and sub doctrines need to be evolved on the amazing achievement lest this be lost to future generations. Surprisingly, not many senior veterans experienced in this domain have ventured into expanding on the learning value of this experience.

I was once involved with the review of the Indian Military Doctrine, way back in 2008-9. The exercise itself enhanced my intellectual faculties when I found that there was much I had not cared to read upon and there was much I had read and experienced which did not seem to find place in the document. I wrote a 30-page review and was pleasantly surprised to receive positive feedback from HQ ARTRAC. The experience taught me one thing. No one has ever written a perfect doctrine. There is scope for debate further improvement of any doctrine that exists. However, a doctrine once accepted must be the common factor among guidelines while debate continues. This write up is only to initiate more thought on writing good and appropriate doctrines for the Indian Army.