Pakistan’s ban on Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) marks a turning point in the country’s sectarian politics. The crackdown not only signals the state’s hardening stance but also shatters long-held Barelvi aspirations, exposing deep historical grievances and the shifting balance of power within Pakistan’s Sunni landscape.

Background

TLP and Its ban in Oct 2025. Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) is a far-right Islamist political party in Pakistan, rooted in Barelvi Sunni Islam. The party is known for its hard-line stance on blasphemy laws and its populist street power. It was founded on 01 August 2015 by Khadim Hussain Rizvi, a fiery cleric and former government employee. After his death in 2020, TLP has been led by his son, Saad Hussain Rizvi. The party is headquartered in Lahore, Punjab.

TLP represents a political crystallisation of Pakistan’s Barelvi Sunnis, from a tradition historically rooted in Sufi practices and devotional reverence for Prophet Muhammad. Its core ideology revolves around defending the honour of the Prophet, especially through strict enforcement of blasphemy laws. Unlike earlier Barelvi movements that focused on spiritual authority, shrine-based worship, and the Pir-Murid (master-disciple) tradition, TLP has channelled this religious sentiment into street-level activism and electoral politics. TLP’s rhetoric is emotionally charged, often invoking martyrdom, sacrifice, and religious duty to mobilise support.

TLP gained national prominence in 2017 during the three-week Faizabad sit-in, protesting changes to the electoral oath regarding the finality of Prophethood. The Pakistani government was forced to capitulate. TLP’s strength lies in its appeal among lower-middle-class Sunni Barelvi Pakistanis, especially in Punjab, Sindh, and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. TLP has repeatedly used tactics of massive street protests and road blockades to enforce its writ.

Electoral performance. While not dominant in parliament, TLP has won local seats and demonstrated surprising vote shares in Punjab. It secured the fifth-largest vote share in the 2018 elections and the fourth-largest in 2024, outperforming all other religious parties.

October 2025 Crackdown and Ban. TLP organised a “Gaza Solidarity” march from Lahore to Islamabad (9–14 Oct 2025), protesting the Gaza conflict and US involvement. The Pakistani government launched a major crackdown on TLP after violent clashes with police in Muridke. Although the government enforced a strict press gag, unconfirmed reports indicate that scores of TLP cadres were killed in police firing and hundreds arrested. TLP was subsequently banned on 23 October 2025. Despite the ban, the group retains significant grassroots support and remains a potent force in Pakistan’s religious politics. It continues to enjoy strong backing among Barelvi Sunnis, especially in Punjab, due to its emotive religious messaging and anti-Western stance.

TLP’s emergence has reshaped Pakistan’s religious and civic discourse in several ways. After decades of marginalisation, TLP has reasserted Barelvi identity in public life, challenging the dominance of Deobandi and Wahhabi/Salafi groups. However, its uncompromising stance on blasphemy and religious dissent has contributed to sectarian tensions and a shrinking space for pluralism. TLP’s ability to mobilise thousands and confront security forces poses a governance dilemma for the Pakistani state.

Overview of the Sunni Barelvi Movement. The Sunni Barelvi movement was founded by Ahmed Raza Khan (1856–1921) of Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh. The movement emphasises the following:-

• Deep reverence for the Prophet
• Acceptance of Sufi practices such as veneration of saints, shrine-based rituals, intercession, and devotional poetry.

Due to these practices, Barelvis are opposed by more puritanical movements such as the Deobandis and Wahhabis, who consider rituals like Urs (death-anniversary commemorations), ziyarat (visiting graves), and qawwalis to be bid’ah (innovations) and bordering on shirk (polytheism).

Conversely, Barelvis criticise Deobandis and Wahhabis for being disrespectful towards the Prophet and Sufi saints.

Role of Barelvis in the Creation of Pakistan

Barelvis played an important role in the creation of Pakistan, primarily through religious mobilisation and endorsement of the Muslim League’s demand for a separate Muslim state. In contrast, Deobandi leadership opposed Partition, fearing it would divide Muslims.

Mass mobilisation in the 1946 elections. These elections became effectively a referendum on Pakistan. Barelvi networks, especially Sufi pirs and sajjada nashins, commanded deep loyalty among rural Muslims and were instrumental in mobilising support for the Muslim League. Their endorsement gave the League crucial religious legitimacy. The result was overwhelming. The Muslim League won over 87% of Muslim-reserved seats, sidelining rival Muslim parties.

Post-Independence Marginalisation of Barelvis. Despite their early support, Barelvis were marginalised after 1947. Symbolically, the first Pakistani flag was hoisted by a Deobandi cleric. The Pakistani state attempted to detach itself from its Indic cultural foundations and recast its identity around a faux-Arab ancestry narrative, favouring Deobandi and Wahhabi ideologies over the syncretic Barelvi tradition.

Impact of State Marginalisation. As a direct consequence of state’s step motherly treatment to Barelvis, the following happened:-

• Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith madrasas received more state patronage, and Deobandi clerics were recruited as government mosque imams.
• Sufi shrines were placed under government control via the Auqaf Department, reducing the autonomy of hereditary custodians.
• Religious councils became dominated by Deobandi/Wahhabi scholars.
• Politically, Jamaat-e-Islami and JUI (Deobandi) rose in prominence, while Barelvis lacked organised leadership and strategy.
• Under General Zia-ul-Haq, puritanical Islam gained state backing, further marginalising Barelvi practices like Milad, Urs, Shrine veneration and visits to graves (Ziyarat-al-Qubur) which were considered close to Hindu Practices.

Attacks on Shrines.  Barelvi shrines have repeatedly been targeted by Deobandi/Salafi extremist groups such as TTP, ISIS/IS-KP, and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, who consider Sufi rituals heretical. Major attacks include the following:-

• 2006. Suicide bombing in Karachi killed the entire leadership of the Barelvi Sunni Tehreek.
• Abdullah Shah Ghazi Shrine, Karachi (2010). Twin suicide blasts killed nine.
• Sakhi Sarwar Shrine, Dera Ghazi Khan (2011). Over 50 killed.
• Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, Sehwan Sharif (2017). Over 80 killed during dhamaal.
• Data Darbar, Lahore (2010 and 2019). Multiple deadly attacks near Pakistan’s most revered Sufi shrine.

Barelvi Resurgence

In this atmosphere of insecurity and marginalisation, the formation of TLP in 2015 marked a major Barelvi resurgence. However, the recent crackdown and ban have, once again shattered Barelvi aspirations for equitable political power in Pakistan.

Conclusion. The vision of Pakistan was championed by the Muslim League under Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Sir Zafarullah Khan, both from minority Muslim sects (Shia and Ahmadiyya). Barelvi support, however, supplied the numerical strength and legitimacy needed to secure Pakistan’s creation. Post-independence, Pakistan’s Sunni majority began targeting minorities including Hindus, Sikhs, Shias, and Ahmadiyyas. They were declared as heretics and in Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan led riots of 1953, around 2000 Ahmadiyyas were killed. Zafaraullah Khan was forced to resign and leave Pakistan. Shias have fared no better; hundreds have been killed by TTP and ISKP, especially in Parachinar.

In this deeply polarised sectarian landscape, the third pillar of Pakistan’s creation, the Barelvis, are now also marginalised by Deobandi and Salafi dominance. The banning of TLP thus represents not merely a law-and-order action but the collapse of Barelvi political aspirations in Pakistan.