Parachinar, the capital of Kurram District in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, is a region rife with sectarian tensions. Located just 110 km from Kabul, Afghanistan, Parachinar’s proximity to the Afghan provinces of Paktia, Khost, Logar, and Nangarhar – strongholds of anti-Shia militant groups such as ISIS/IS-KP and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) makes it a flashpoint for violence.

Background: Sectarian Sunni-Shia Conflict in Parachinar

             Sectarian Divide: Pakistan, a Sunni-majority country, has long been the site of violence against its Shia minority. Kurram District, especially Upper Kurram, is Shia-majority. However, access to the rest of Pakistan requires transit through Lower Kurram, which is predominantly Sunni, exacerbating tensions.

             Strategic Importance: Parachinar’s location near Afghanistan and the presence of militant groups have made it a hotspot for sectarian violence. The resurgence of TTP and ISIS/IS-KP, particularly after the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul in 2021, has intensified anti-Shia attacks. These groups openly label Shias as heretics and target them with brutal violence.

             Historical Context: Sectarian tensions in Kurram predate Pakistan’s independence. The first major sectarian conflict erupted in 1961 during a Muharram procession in Sadda. Subsequent clashes occurred in 1971, 1987, 1996, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2020, 2022, 2023, and most recently in 2024.

             Militant Organizations: Sunni militant groups involved in massacres include the TTP, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), ISIS/IS-KP, and elements of the Afghan Taliban. These groups have escalated sectarian tensions, often using madrassas to indoctrinate followers.

Recent Violence in Parachinar

             2007–2011: After the Taliban’s ouster from Afghanistan in 2001, militants established sanctuaries in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Sectarian clashes escalated in 2007 when the Sunni Taliban attempted to seize Parachinar. Shia militias were formed to resist. This conflict resulted in over 3,000 deaths, thousands of injuries, and the displacement of entire villages.

             2013: Twin bombings on July 26, 2013, near Shia mosques in Parachinar’s marketplace killed at least 57 people and injured over 150. Sunni militant groups claimed responsibility.

             2017: A January 2017 bomb blast in Parachinar’s Shia-dominated market killed 25 people and injured 87. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Pakistani Taliban claimed joint responsibility.

             2023: In May 2023, five Shia schoolteachers and two laborers were executed in a government school, sparking deadly sectarian violence. Clashes spread across Kurram District, with towns like Parachinar and Sadda targeted by heavy weapons, including anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). Dozens of Shias were killed in the ensuing violence.

             2024: The latest bout of violence erupted in July 2024 over a land dispute in Boshehra village, 15 km south of Parachinar. The fighting, which spread across Kurram District, has resulted in over 200 Shia deaths and hundreds more injured as of November 2024.

The Broader Implications

The violence in Parachinar is emblematic of Pakistan’s broader failure to address sectarian divides and counter militant extremism. The involvement of groups like TTP, ISIS/IS-KP, and LeJ, coupled with the state’s inability—or unwillingness—to provide security, leaves Shia communities vulnerable to recurring massacres. If left unaddressed, the ongoing violence risks further destabilizing the region and undermining social cohesion in Pakistan.

Comments

Blockade of Parachinar

Blocking the sole road connecting Parachinar to the rest of Pakistan via Peshawar, the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, remains a common tactic employed by Sunni groups to gradually choke the Shia-majority population in Parachinar, Upper Kurram. These militant groups have escalated their attacks using heavy weaponry, including rockets and missiles, resulting in significant casualties and widespread destruction, underscoring the intensity of the ongoing conflict.

Shia Recruitment for the Zainabiyoun Brigade

Rough estimates suggest that between 700 and 5,000 Pakistani Shia youth from Karachi, Parachinar, and Gilgit-Baltistan were recruited by Iran to join the Zainabiyoun Brigade. These recruits were deployed to Syria to defend Shia holy sites from Sunni Daesh (ISIS) fighters in support of the Bashar al-Assad regime. Alarmed by the potential threat posed by these battle-hardened veterans upon their return, Pakistan banned the Zainabiyoun Brigade in April 2024.

Impact on Local Population

The ongoing violence has devastated the local Shia population in Parachinar. The blockade of critical roads has caused severe shortages of food, medicine, and fuel, leaving the community in a dire state. Schools and businesses have been disrupted, posing long-term socio-economic challenges. These sustained and targeted attacks appear to be part of a deliberate effort to eradicate the Shia community from the region.

Pakistani and International Responses

The lack of decisive action from Pakistan’s Sunni-dominated central and local government has only deepened the plight of Parachinar’s Shias. Mainstream Pakistani media and international coverage have largely remained silent on the issue. This indifference is glaringly evident when contrasted with the Pakistani government’s vocal criticism of human rights violations in other regions, such as Palestine, while ignoring the targeted killings of Shias and Shia Hazaras within its own borders.

The muted Indian response to the violence is equally puzzling, potentially stemming from a lack of awareness about the geopolitical significance of these events in its immediate neighbourhood.

Conclusion

Pakistan was founded on the two-nation theory, which proposed that Muslims would not be safe in a Hindu-majority India, necessitating the creation of a separate Islamic state. This vision, championed by Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Sir Zafarullah Khan, both of whom belonged to minority Muslim sects (Shia and Ahmadiyya, respectively), initially aimed to create a unified homeland for Muslims. However, this ideal has unraveled over time.

Post-independence, Pakistan’s Sunni majority began targeting not only religious minorities like Hindus and Sikhs but also Islamic sects such as Shias and Ahmadiyyas. Jinnah’s vision of an inclusive Islamic state now seems a distant dream, with systemic discrimination and violence against minorities becoming entrenched in Pakistani society.

Theological strife in the region extends beyond Pakistan. In Afghanistan, Sunni factions like the Salafist ISIS/IS-KP and the Deobandi Taliban continue their internecine war, employing brutal tactics, including suicide bombings, to assert dominance. Similarly, in Bangladesh, Sunni groups have targeted Hindus, Buddhists, and other indigenous faiths, while also attacking the Ahmadiyya community and their places of worship.

The worsening sectarian and ethnic violence across South Asia underscores the fragility of the region’s socio-religious fabric. Without decisive action and a commitment to inclusivity, these theological states risk further polarization and instability, threatening their long-term viability as cohesive nations.