Pakistan’s 1965 war with India is an event to be remembered and reflected upon. It began in Pakistan in March 1965 on the Kutch-Sind (Pakistan) border in Gujarat with minor clashes between the Gujarat Armed Police and Pakistani para-military Indus Rangers and ended with 22 days of fighting between both the armies and air forces in September in J&K and Punjab. Both Pakistan and India claimed victory. However, neutral observers have opined that at the end of the war India held the upper hand, though both sides held parts of each other’s territory and the battlefield casualties were almost equal. In the air war, Pakistan’s performance may have been superior as they held the initiative.

As outcomes, Pakistan was handed a strategic defeat in its plan to capture J&K, while India succeeded in its defensive strategic aims. For the most part, the Indian Air Force and the Indian Army fought their own separate wars against Pakistan. At the operational level of war, the Indian counter-offensive did not do as well as it could have, while the Pakistani Army frittered away initial successes due to incompetent direction of war at the strategic level. At the tactical level, there was courage, grit, determination and individual gallantry on both sides, and some failures too.

The basic sequence of events was a warm-up mini-war in April 1965 in the Rann of Kutch with hostilities initiated by Pakistan. From May 1965 onwards, Pakistan devoted its efforts in trying to wrest Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) from India by force, with a major invasion on 05th August 1965 by a guerrilla force. On 1st September 1965 Pakistan launched a conventional attack on the southern part of J&K, with the aim of capturing Akhnur and Jammu, thereby isolating J&K from the rest of India. On 6th September India counter-attacked in the Lahore sector in Punjab, following up with another attack into the Sialkot sector. Pakistan, in turn, vigorously counter-attacked the Indian offensive in the Lahore sector, initially disorganizing it, but its tank-heavy attack suffered from loss of momentum and it petered out. The UN-mandated cease-fire came into effect on 23 September 1965.

The Battle of the ‘Bets’

A part of the Kutch-Sind border had come under dispute since 1956. Pakistan had started claiming 9,065 sq kms of the Rann of Kutch, the annually inundated salt desert, North of the 24th parallel (generally, the line Ding-Sural). After Pakistani encroachments were detected in January 1965, elements of India’s Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) were inducted to strengthen the border posts. These posts were situated on the few islands, known as ‘bets’, dotted around the Rann. Indian Army troops from the 31 Infantry Brigade at Dhrangadhra, near Jamnagar, were also inducted into the sector, though the Army was not tasked to man any posts along the border.

Ding had been occupied by the Indus Rangers, and they were pushed back on 4 April by the CRPF. On 7April, Pakistan launched ‘Operation DESERT HAWK’ using 51 Infantry Brigade of 8 Infantry Division under Maj Gen Tikka Khan, with two armoured regiments equipped with brand new M-47 and M-48 Patton tanks.

The second phase of the Pakistani offensive began on 26 April in which 6 Infantry Brigade under Brig Eftikhar Janjua pushed back the Indian forces and penetrated right up to Biar Bet. In response, the Indian Army moved 50 Independent Para Brigade to the area and  established a new controlling HQ called Kilo Sector, under Maj Gen PO Dunn. Dunn now had two brigades to cover the entire 230-km Kutch-Sind frontier.

The Army Chief Gen. JN Chaudhuri decided that other than for a short holding operation, the ground and overall situation in the Rann of Kutch was not suitable for a proper defensive battle and advised the Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri accordingly. Shastri decided to allow the army the freedom to decide its own response, making the announcement in the Indian Parliament on 28 April. Thereafter the Indian Army mobilised its field formations in Punjab as a counterpoise. A cease-fire was arrived at on 01 May through the urging of the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson.

The Invasion of Kashmir-Part I

The Pakistan Army, pleased with its performance in the Kutch, was encouraged to press on with its plans for attack by infiltration into J&K later that year in an operation called ‘Operation GIBRALTAR’. Its overall aim was to first ‘de-freeze’ the situation in J&K, and then to capture the entire state. In May 2015, from three of its posts in the vicinity of the Cease-Fire Line (CFL) in the Kargil area, Pakistan began interdicting Srinagar- Leh road with artillery fire. On 16 May, it physically assaulted an Indian post in the area. The Indian Army retaliated with 4th Rajput attacking on night 16/17 May and capturing the most dominating Pakistani post in the sector, Point 13,620. Strangely, this post was returned to Pakistan soon after as ‘a gesture of goodwill’.

In May itself, Pakistan had begun preparations to capture Kashmir by force in three sequential phases. In Phase I,  guerrilla forces of the Pakistan Army, primarily from its ‘Azad Kashmir Regular Forces’ (AKRF) and locally-recruited ‘mujahids’ were to infiltrate across the CFL with specific tasks. In Phase II, it was anticipated that residents of the entire state would rise in revolt, and would call for assistance from the Pakistan Army. The third phase envisaged a conventional invasion by the Pakistan Army with a semblance of legality. Thus instructors in ‘irregular warfare’ from Pakistan’s 19 Baluch were sent to POK to train troops of the AKRF and the mujahids.

Pakistan’s ‘Operation GIBRALTAR’, began on night 05/06 August 1965 as 7,000 armed infiltrators crossed the CFL in organized groups in the areas of Akhnur, Rajouri, Gulmarg, Uri, and Mendhar. Realising the nature and scale of the infiltration, the task of dealing with the infiltrators was handed-over to the Army. In the Tithwal sector of the Kashmir valley, the infiltrators had considerable success, striking at an incoming infantry battalion during a routine annual turnover of units. The unit lost its Commanding Officer and 26 others were killed and wounded.

From 12 to 16 August, Pakistan attacked an Indian post in Kargil, and started heavy shelling  in the Chhamb area. The Indian Infantry Brigade in Kargil, retaliated by capturing Pakistani posts along the CFL, including capturing Pt. 13,620 a second time. On 14 August a large infiltrating force had made a lodgement across the thinly-defended border in the Chhamb sector, supported by Pakistani artillery, and occupied the Laleali-Kalidhar area. The continued Pakistani artillery fire caused a number of casualties including the Brigade Commander of 191 Brigade, Brig. B. F Master. However, 21 August onwards, the Indian Army had begun to recapture or forcefully evict the infiltrators in the Kashmir Valley. Soon the situation was restored in Tithwal and Chhamb sectors.

In a daring and boldly-executed operation which started on the night of 25 August, 68 Infantry Brigade, made up to a four-battalion force, captured the Haji Pir Pass.  The brigade, commanded by Brig (later Lt Gen) Zorawar Bakshi, VrC, comprised the 1Para, 4 Rajput, 19 Punjab, 6 J&K Rifles and 164 Field Regiment of Artillery. (Read more about the battle on page 22)

Towards the end of August it was abundantly clear to Pakistan that its attempt to seize J&K through large-scale infiltration was coming to naught. The locals, except some in the Rajouri sector, had not supported the infiltrators. Nevertheless Pakistan went ahead with the next planned phase of the operations to capture J&K– the launch of the conventional operations by the Pakistan Army, designated ‘Operation GRAND SLAM’.

The Invasion of Kashmir Part II

It was aimed at capturing J&K by severing the road link in the Chicken’s Neck area, South of Akhnur. This was sought to be achieved in two sub-phases, the first to capture Akhnur, thus severing the Jammu-Rajouri-Punch road, and then to exploit towards and severe the major artery Pathankot-Jammu-Srinagar. Within ‘Operation GRAND SLAM’ itself there were to be various tactical phases as necessitated by the terrain and the estimated progress of the operations. The precursor to this attack across the International Border was the radio broadcast made on 01 September by President Ayub Khan, proclaiming to his people that it was the duty of Pakistan to help the Kashmiri ‘freedom fighters’. The operation started with a strong attack against the Chhamb-Jaurian-Akhnur sector, bounded in the west by the CFL and in the south by the International Border. It is good tank country, and close to Pakistan’s military bases of Sialkot and Kharian.

The sector was defended by the Indian 191 Infantry Brigade with five infantry battalions, and provided fire support by an artillery field regiment (25-pounder) and a battery of medium guns (5.5 inch). It also had a squadron of light tanks, the French AMX 30. An armed police battalion (3 Punjab Armed Police) manned the border outposts, and 3 J&K Militia partly held defences in a less-threatened hilly area. A new divisional HQ(10 Infantry Division) was under raising for this sector. The new HQ however, was not fully operational, though the designated commander, Maj Gen DB Chopra had arrived, leading to a bit of a flux in the chain of command.

Pakistan’s attack at first light on that morning was launched by three brigades of 12 Infantry Division. This force was given the artillery fire support of the full 4 Corps Artillery Brigade, consisting of about 40 field guns, 40 medium guns and eight 8-inch guns, a truly formidable fire support component. This also meant that the radio communications of the attacking force were doubly ensured through the forward observers of the artillery. They were also given two regiments of armour, 11 Cavalry and 13 Lancers, with the new American Patton tanks. Curiously, HQ 7 Infantry Division was ‘in support’.

The attack led by the armoured regiments nearly succeeded in  capturing Akhnur. Its initial success brought the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) into the war by the same evening, with the elderly jet fighter, the Vampire of the IAF’s No 45 Squadron being tasked for close air support.

The attack proceeded rapidly till last light on 01 September, with Pakistan reaching the line of river Munawar Tawi, a partial tank obstacle. Thereafter there was a lull in the attack for all of 02 September, caused by Pakistan changing the command arrangement, inexplicably placing assaulting troops under HQ 7 Infantry Division. This lull allowed India’s 10 Infantry Division to be re-organised and establish a fresh defensive layout. As the Pakistani offensive lost its momentum, 41 Mountain Brigade was also allotted to 10 Infantry Division and the defences were fortified further with 28 Infantry Brigade placed in support, though held as a Corps Reserve.

The consternation felt in Delhi at the progress of Pakistan’s attack, which resumed at noon on 3rd September set in a chain of events that dominate the accounts of the ‘22-Day War’.As the Pakistani operation progressed, 41 Infantry Brigade’s defences were penetrated on 04 September. 28 Brigade, however, held on and by 06 September Pakistani attacks had failed to achieve the objective. By now Delhi had decided to take the battle into Pakistan territory.

The Indian Riposte: ‘Operation ABLAZE’

India’s 11 Corps was launched into attack on 6 September 1965 at 0530 hours along three separate axes, each with an infantry division, and took Pakistan by surprise. The initial plan of 11 Corps (consisting mainly of 15 Infantry Division, 4 Mountain Division, 7 Infantry Division,and 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade) was to secure the East bank of the Ichhogil Canal. The leading battalion, 3 Jat reached the canal and against heavy fire, two of its companies crossed over and reached Batapur on the outskirts of Lahore.

To dwell on the details of the ding-dong battles that ensued in the Punjab would be tedious. However, some major actions and events must be mentioned :

The first of these was Pakistan’s air attacks on IAF bases on 6th September, soon after the Indian attack across the border. The PAF’s attacks were directed at the Indian air bases at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara, of which the attack on Pathankot was successful, with 10 aircraft destroyed on the ground.

The second was Pakistan’s ‘counter-offensive’ on 7 September by 1 Armoured Division and 11 Infantry Division, along the axis of the Grand Trunk (GT) Road. The Pakistani Armoured Division attempted to make good the boast of President Ayub that with its new tanks Pakistan could ‘stroll down the GT Road and reach Delhi in a few hours’.Pakistani advance surprised the relatively lightly-equipped Indian 4 Mountain Division which itself had been advancing, and threw the Division into near-chaos for some time. This attack, too, petered out inexplicably and ultimately resulted in heavy tank casualties to Pakistan Army.

The third note-worthy action was India’s attack, launched by 1 Corps into the Sialkot area. Its military aim was to isolate Sialkot from Lahore. This would also relieve the pressure on the Chhamb sector to its north and divide Pakistan’s response. The attack was launched at 0200 hours from the direction of Kaluchak and Samba across the International Border. The main strike force of the 1 Corps attack was the Indian 1 Armoured Division. The main thrust-line of the attack was to be the line Phillora-Chawinda- Daska on the Sialkot-Gujranwala road. 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade, captured Phillora on 11 September after a hard fight in which 5/9 Gorkha Rifles distinguished itself. Lt Col AB Tarapore, Commanding Officer of 17 Horse exhibited exemplary military leadership and inspired his regiment to dominate the battlefield, refusing to be evacuated even when wounded, and continued to direct his regiment’s battle till his last breath. Later the armoured division was brought to a halt at Chawinda between 14 and 20 September opposed by Pakistan’s 6 Armoured Division and supporting elements. This battle has been described as the biggest tank battle since World War II, with five regiments of tanks, three Indian and two Pakistani, engaged in battle. The heroes at Chawinda for Pakistan were Brig Abdul Ali Malik, Commander 24 Infantry Brigade, Brig. AAK Chaudhry, Commander 4 Corps Artillery Brigade, and Pakistan’s 25 Cavalry, which was under 24 Brigade of Brig Malik.

The fourth action of note was the failure of Pakistan’s counter-offensive towards the GT Road. This failure was due to loss of momentum, caused by the combination of two disparate violation of Principles of War. The two-division force was commanded by their respective Divisional Commanders, but the GOC of 11 Infantry Division being the senior of the two, was made the ‘co-ordinator’ of the two-division force. This resulted in his issuing orders to both the divisions, which created confusion. It eventually forced the GHQ to directly take over command of this force, which they were ill-equipped for. The second reason was halting the Pakistani armoured regiments, which advancing with gusto and enthusiasm were halted on day 2 (7 September) and thus lost the momentum.

The fifth was the actions of the Indian 2 Independent Armoured Brigade after it was placed under command of 4 Mountain Division on 9 September. The Brigade Commander, Brig Theograj, deployed his brigade in a defensive layout of two tactical arcs. These were completely effective and utilised the Centurion tanks best against the more modern Pattons. The first Pakistani attack of two regiments of Patton tanks that began at 0200 hours on 9 September was beaten back by the combination of Indian armour, Infantry’s 106 mm recoilless anti-tank guns, minefields, and the full force of the 4 Division’s Artillery Brigade. On 10 September the Pakistani armour made another attempt to break through 4 Mountain Division’s defences. The day began with an attack on the defences of 4th Grenadiers. The battalion’s recoilless rifles took them on from the cover of the sugarcane crop, with a total of 137 rounds of 106 mm High-Explosive Anti-Tank ammunition fired by the eight guns of the battalion. CQMH Abdul Hamid, reverted to his original recoilless gun platoon at the outbreak of the war, personally knocked out five Pakistani tanks in two days before being hit and killed by a Pakistani tank. The attempted out-flanking moves of the Pakistani tanks brought them onto the 105 mm guns of the Centurion tanks of 3 Cavalry which decimated them. A count after the battle revealed that Pakistan had lost 97 tanks, including 72 of the new Pattons. The tank battle at the prophetically-named village of Asal Uttar became known as the ‘Battle of Asal Uttar’.

The battle finally ended with 4 Mountain Division’s attempts to re-capture of Khem Karan, culminating in an abortive divisional attack on the night 21/22 September.

A cease-fire was ordered by the Security Council of the United Nations, which had been in frenzied sessions since the last phase of the war began and came into effect at 0330 hours on 23 September 1965.

What had been achieved?

India held 1,800 sq km of Pakistani territory while Pakistan held 540 sq km of Indian territory. 3,000 Indian soldiers had been killed, while about 3,800 Pakistani soldiers had been killed. The IAF had flown 3,937 sorties, the PAF had flown 2,364 sorties. About 25 Pakistani and 60 Indian aircraft were lost in the air war, though official claims on both sides vary around these figures. In other respects, the air war was a stalemate, with neither side able to achieve complete air superiority. India lost 128 tanks; Pakistan lost over 300 tanks. As a neutral observer commented: “New Delhi achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan’s attempt to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated.”