The Rann of Kutch is a salt waste, separating Sind from Kutch in the north, and Radhanpur and Kathiawar from the east and south. A barren expanse of land- the Rann forms the southern boundary of Sind from the south western border of Rajasthan the Arabian Sea. It is in this piece of geo-politically sensitive land the first shot of the prelude to a monsoon war rang out in the summer of 1965. The area had been a sore point between the areas of Sind and Kutch, even before partition- it was a bone of contention without any real solution.

The Muslim majority Sind went to Pakistan while the Hindu areas of Kutch remained with India.

The first sign of trouble in the area began in 1964, with frequent trespassing of Pakistani troops into Indian territory. Kanjarkot, was essentially a fort in ruins, close to the Pakistani border. It was surrounded by a flat plain to the south and an undulating bank of sand dunes to the north. The dunes dominated the area immediately surrounding the fort, and provided the Pakistanis a clear view of Indian territory.

The communications also favoured the Pakistanis more than the Indians. The Indian administrative base at Bhuj was 177 kms south of the border while the advance maintenance area being established at Khavda was about 104 kms from the border and 119 kms from Vigokot. The Bhuj-Khavda road was susceptible to breaches during the monsoon, and though there was a fair weather landing strip at Khavda and a civil landing ground at Bhuj, the only sizable airstrip for the IAF was at Jamnagar.

Things were better on the Pakistani side. Badin, a sizable town, was only about 30 kms from the border. It was well equipped with a large airfield with radar, which was capable of handling all kinds of transport and fighter aircraft, and located close to Hyderabad (Sind) and Khairpur. There was also a road connecting Badin to Maro, and further east to Nagar Parkar.

On 13 May 1964, three Pakistani intruders were arrested and subsequently released by the State Reserve Police. No further incidents occurred to mar bilateral relations for the rest of that year, but early in 1965, the dice rolled again.

In February 1965, Indian troops patrolling the border reported a build-up of Pakistani troops on the opposite side of the border at Kanjarkot. The Pakistanis had established a vehicle track, running from Surai to Ding, through Indian territory, south of Kanjarkot.

The Indian Border Police increased their nightly patrols, but this measure was met with a standing patrol by the Pakistanis. India had no option but to take suitable measures to evict Pakistan from the area.

On 21 February 1965, “Operation Kabadi” was launched- the Area Commander of Maharashtra and Gujarat Area, Major General PC Gupta, MC, issued Operation Instruction No. 1 to Brigadier SSM Pahaljani, Commander, 31 Infantry Brigade Group, to capture Kanjarkot.

Operation Kabbadi, February 1965

The Headquarters 31 Infantry Brigade Group comprised of 11 Field Regiment, 226 Independent Workshop Company, 373 Field Company Engineers, 31 Infantry Brigade Signal Company, Army Service Corps and 407 Medical Company- the formation firmed up and reached Bhuj on 27 February, to join the troops of the 17 Rajputana Rifles (Sawai Man Guards) which were already stationed there.  On 26 February, the Army Headquarters arranged to send 7 Companies of police to Ahmedabad. A Parachute Battalion was also placed on 24 hours notice to move to the area, should the need arise

Learning of India’s counter-moves, Pakistan lost no time in retaliating. The operational control of the Indus Rangers was handed over to GOC 8 Infantry Division, Major General Tikka Khan. He was ordered to take effective measures for retaliation.  The 8 Frontier Force was moved to Khadan on 6 March 1965 to reinforce the posts at Rahim-ki-Bazar and Kanjarkot as part of 51 Infantry Brigade.

The sudden and intense build-up  by the Pakistani military at Kanjarkot was alarming enough for the Indian armed forces to work extra hard to turn the prevailing natural conditions on their side of the border to their advantage as best they could. Within days, India had constructed positions which Pakistani forces would ultimately be unable to recover due to inadequate weapons and number of troops. On 13 March 1965, the Central Reserve Police constructed Sardar Post, 4,600 metres to the southwest of Kanjarkot. Sardar Post was a flat mud-terrace, with sparse foliage or tree-cover.

Pakistan’s Operation Desert Hawk on Sardar Post

On the morning of 07 April 1965, the 51st Infantry Brigade of the Pakistan Army tried to storm Indian posts in Kutch in a series of operations nicknamed “Operation Desert Hawk”. However, the Indian forces, though they were numerically inferior, managed to beat back the repeated attacks, inflicting heavy casualties on the Pakistani troops. The battle of Sardar Post is tagged as one of the most glorious chapters in the military history of the post independent India, made possible by the brave hearts of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) on 09 April 1965 when only two Companies of the 2nd Battalion CRPF (Second to None) stood their ground and repulsed an entire Infantry Brigade of the Pakistan Army. In the words of then Union Home Minister, Gulzari Lal Nanda, “this battle will go down in the history of Indian Police, nay in the history of military battle.”

The 51st Infantry Brigade comprising 8 FRONTIER FORCE; 18 PUNJAB & 6 BALUCH- launched simultaneous attacks on Sardar Post and Tak Post. At pre-dawn, sensing movement about 50 to 100, Head Constable Ranjit Singh challenged the intruders, and his action was met with a rain of bullets from the opposite direction. This was rapidly followed by artillery fire from 25 pounder guns. Rushing to his aid, Singh’s fellow soldiers took up their positions, and retaliated bravely. Soon all the personnel deployed at the Post realised that it was a full-scale attack by the Pakistanis.

Prior to the attack a patrolling party under the Command of Subedar Kabirman Subba was sent to patrol the area on that fateful night. This party was trapped between firing on both sides. Despite the precarious situation, the party slowly advanced towards their camp through a nala and sent a signal to Tak Post.  The Tak Post Commander however, asked Head Constable Mahadev Nilgunde to investigate, as he felt that it might be a move of the enemy to infiltrate the Post in the guise of CRPF personnel. Despite concentrated enemy fire in the area, Head Constable Nilgunde left the Post, and only after Jamadar Jainarayan Singh of the night patrol was identified, was the patrol allowed to move in.

CRPF archives record a well-thought out strategy adapted during the battle; the Post Commander ordered his men to hold their fire after some amount of firing in order to conserve the ammunition. This decision proved to be a game-changer for the ensuing battle. The sudden, deafening silence from the Indian side even as the mists of the night drifted towards dawn, led the Pakistanis to believe that all the personnel manning the Post had been killed or wounded. Nevertheless, the incoming Pakistani Columns fanned out, surrounding Sardar Post. There was still not a ‘sign of life’ from the Indian forces. All was quiet. The attacking enemy infantry columns then crept even closer. Immediately, a hail of bullets rang out, and flattened the unsuspecting enemy. Another wave of enemy attackers, coming in from the rear, met with the same fate as their predecessors who had fallen in front. Fourteen of them were injured and 04 were captured.

It is to the credit of Constable Shiv Ram of Sardar Post that he detected enemy movement 600 yards away, despite the grave risk from intermittent enemy shelling, he ran to Tak Post to inform Subedar Balbir Singh, who was in charge of the 3 inch mortar, about this.

Subedar Balbir Singh was quick enough to direct Indian mortar fire to destroy the enemy Observation Post (OP).  Constable Shiv Ram then returned to Sardar Post. Later in the day, he noticed enemy vehicles moving in from the north east. Again at personal risk he went to Tak, gave the information to Subedar Balbir Singh and as a result the vehicles were either put out of action or forced to withdraw. One Observation Post which was inside the Tak Post, was then destroyed by Head Constable Mahadev Nilgunde as it posed a potential danger should it be captured by the enemy.

Meanwhile a message was conveyed to Tak Post to send extra ammunition to Sardar Post for the MMGs (medium machine guns). Despite heavy shelling CT/DVR (Constable/Driver) Kishan Singh volunteered to supply the ammunition in a Jeep, which to his credit and immense bravery, he did three times. There was a brief moment when the Pakistanis achieved slight success, when one of the machine guns on the north-eastern corners of the Post got jammed. Nevertheless, the CRPF men rallied swiftly, continuing their defence of the Sardar Post to the last man. As the Pakistanis moved in closer, Head Constable Bhawana Ram, deployed on the eastern parameter of Sardar Post, displayed commendable vision and when the MMG in his area was silenced he collected all the grenades at his Post and kept throwing them at the incoming Pakistani troops. Indeed, his gallantry was to a great extent instrumental in demoralising the intruders and forcing them to retreat from the Post. The exchange of fire lasted over 12 hours during which the enemy made three attempts – all in vain – to overrun the Post. The Pakistanis were eventually beaten back, but they succeeded in taking 19 CRPF men captive including the Post Commander, Major Sardar Karnail Singh. The retaliation by the CRPF men was so fierce and unexpected that despite their numerical and armament superiority, the enemy was compelled to flee.

Aftermath at Sardar Post

The fleeing Pakistan Army left behind 34 dead soldiers including two Officers. Four Pakistani soldiers were captured.  Six CRPF personnel made the supreme sacrifice for the cause of the nation is a unique and unparalleled feat in military history, where a heavily outnumbered contingent of Paramilitary personnel forced the withdrawal of a regular army Infantry Brigade and, what is more, held them at bay for over 12 hours.

Post Script

The actions of the CRPF at Sardar Post remain etched in the annals of military history and geography. The attack by the Pakistan Army in April 1965 continued into a series of attacks on other posts along the Rann of Kutch all through April until the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson offered to negotiate a truce between India and Pakistan at the end of April ‘65.

However, the ceasefire that subsequently came into effect on 01 July 1965, was short lived with Pakistan launching large scale infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir in August itself, leading New Delhi to open up the frontage for offensive operations across the Ceasefire Line at the end of August 1965. More was to come and the Monsoon War of 1965 was upon the nation once again.