Talk of regime change in Iran- intensified by unrest on the streets and mounting international pressure, has moved from speculative academic debate to strategic contingency planning. But for India, the question is not whether Iran’s political order might evolve, but how such evolution could affect our security interests, regional connectivity strategies, and economic priorities. Simplistic analogies to other regime change operations ignore the structural and civilisational depth of the Iranian polity. What matters for India is not just who rules Iran, but how different trajectories might reshape strategic space in West Asia and beyond. It’s all connected.

The Strategic Stakes- from Energy to Connectivity

Iran has long occupied a significant place in India’s external strategy. Historically, Tehran was a major energy supplier; at one point India sourced up to 11 per cent of its crude oil from Iran, prized for its sweet quality and convertibility. Economic realities and sanctions pressure compelled New Delhi to halt crude imports in recent years, but the strategic memory of that relationship persists.

Today, as India seeks deep integration with the global economy, energy cooperation with Iran has diminished. Bilateral trade remains modest but not trivial: India exported roughly USD 1.24 billion worth of goods to Iran in 2024–25, while imports stood around USD 440 million, giving India a trade surplus.

Where Iran remains indispensable is connectivity. The Chabahar Port, developed jointly with India, serves as New Delhi’s gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing the Pakistan corridor and enhancing regional linkage prospects. Projects like the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and associated rail and road connections hinge on stable access through Iranian territory.

Yet this strategic architecture exists in a constrained environment. US sanctions regimes and geopolitical competition have routinely complicated India–Iran engagement. In late 2025, for example, the United States granted India a sanctions waiver for Chabahar operations, then faced subsequent uncertainty over extensions – underscoring the delicate balancing act New Delhi must manage.

Three Plausible Scenarios for Iran’s Future

To make sense of what regime evolution might mean for India, it helps to consider three plausible scenarios – each with distinct implications for Indian strategic interests.

Scenario I: Managed Transition – Continuity with Caution

In this scenario, pressures within Iran — economic stagnation, internal dissent, generational aspirations — lead to a negotiated weakening of traditional clerical dominance. Key institutions, including elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), undergo structural recalibration but remain part of the national security framework under new nomenclature. Leadership seeks sanctions mitigation and economic revival while preserving Iranian strategic autonomy.

Strategic Implications for India

Policy Continuity: India–Iran relations remain fundamentally intact, grounded in mutual interests rather than ideological alignment.

Chabahar’s Role: The port continues to function, though progress may be incremental and subject to external sanctions regimes.

Security Cooperation: India maintains calibrated engagement, especially around connectivity and logistics, while avoiding overt military alignment.

This scenario preserves India’s core interests; stable connectivity options, moderated regional dynamics, and manageable diplomatic engagement despite external pressures.

Scenario II: Western-Aligned Transition- Symbolic Shift, Strategic Constraints

Here, a leadership with clearer Western leanings emerges, potentially involving figures with broader international acceptability. Washington and its allies offer diplomatic and economic incentives, and Tehran initially signals moderation. However, domestic legitimacy imperatives- particularly nationalism and sovereignty concerns – constrain rapid alignment with US or Israeli interests. This is on the presumption that nationalist elements exist and would not be fully constrained by regime change which occurs without coercion.

Strategic Implications for India

Sanctions Calculus: India may face intensified pressure regarding sanctions compliance, but will likely negotiate specific carve-outs given mutual infrastructural interests.

Chabahar’s Standing. Project viability remains intact but subject to greater scrutiny and conditionality from external powers.

Regional Balance: Iran’s regional posture moderates without abandoning autonomous strategic objectives.

This scenario does not translate into a wholesale strategic pivot. India’s interests – connectivity, trade diversification, and regional stability — remain largely intact but require nuanced diplomatic management.

Scenario III: Disorderly Collapse – Civil Conflict and Fragmentation

The most destabilising scenario occurs when regime collapse is abrupt and unstructured. Factionalism within the IRGC and competing power networks yields a prolonged period of internal strife. Civil war conditions, with competing militias and political impasses, erode central authority. Peripheral regions become semi-autonomous, and violence persists over months or years.

Strategic Implications for India

Chabahar Disruption: India’s flagship connectivity project could be stalled indefinitely, undermining access to Central Asia and Afghanistan.

Connectivity Burden: INSTC operationalisation would be severely delayed, diminishing India’s alternatives to the Pakistan-centric corridor.

Energy and Trade: Instability would disrupt trade and investment flows, including India–Iran bilateral trade, and raise insurance and logistical risks.

Security vs Non-Intervention: India would not militarily intervene, but would need to prepare contingency plans for border security, consular evacuations, and diaspora welfare.

India’s domestic context- including sensitivities within its sizable Shia community – would require active engagement to prevent external events from fracturing internal cohesion. Focused outreach by the state emphasizing national interest over emotive affiliations would be essential.

What This Means for India

India’s approach to a changing Iran cannot be rooted in wishful thinking. Strategic interests are grounded in reality, not predictive certainty. If Iran’s internal order evolves, the key variables will include regional security dynamics, continuation of sanctions regimes, great power competition, and Tehran’s own imperative of autonomy.

Across all three scenarios the commonalities that emerge are :-

          Chabahar’s strategic significance endures as a linchpin connecting South and Central Asia, and possibly Europe.

          Energy engagement remains a conditional opportunity, contingent on sanctions relief rather than political rhetoric.

 Regional balance of power considerations — especially regarding China and Pakistan — will shape India’s tactical posture.

Crucially, regime change in Iran would not automatically produce a pro-US government aligned with India’s strategic interests. Iranian leadership, regardless of composition, must navigate its own national interests, not those of external powers. India’s policy should therefore be driven by interest consistency and strategic patience.

Recommendations for Indian Strategy

Against this backdrop, a coherent policy thrust for India should embody the following:-

• Maintain Strategic Autonomy. India must avoid anchoring its Iran strategy to specific political outcomes in Tehran. Its objective should be to preserve long-term interests regardless of who governs.
• Protect Connectivity Infrastructure. Chabahar should be operationalised incrementally and protected diplomatically. This means proactive engagement with Washington to secure sanctions exemptions where possible, and parallel diplomatic outreach to Tehran and regional partners.
• Insulate Trade and Investment. Institutionalise mechanisms that can mitigate sanctions-related risks, including alternative payment channels and multilateral insurance frameworks for India–Iran trade, especially for logistics and connectivity sectors.
• Avoid Militarisation of Indian Policy. India could use military diplomacy, especially in terms of rebuilding Iran-Israel relations. Defence cooperation can be calibrated in ways that build confidence without triggering external sanctions or domestic backlash.
• Engage Domestic Stakeholders. Active engagement with internal communities — including the Indian Shia population — is necessary to reinforce a policy narrative anchored in national interest, not sectarian sentiment.
• Strengthen Regional Partnerships. India’s outreach to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and multilateral frameworks like the Ashgabat Agreement and INSTC should be synchronised to reduce vulnerabilities from overdependence on any single theatre. The Agreement looks at multimodal transport and transit framework designed to improve connectivity between Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia.
• Prepare Contingency Plans. Government planning must include tailored responses for each scenario, with clear triggers and institutional responsibilities for crisis response, economic adjustment, and diplomatic signalling.

Conclusion

Iran is on the cusp of significant transformation. But change in Tehran will not occur in a vacuum. For India, the challenge lies not in predicting which scenario will unfold, but in shaping a strategy that is resilient across multiple futures. Whether Tehran experiences a managed transition, a Western-aligned evolution, or a disorderly collapse, India’s policy must balance strategic patience with clear-sighted action.

Indian interests – from Chabahar and regional connectivity to energy diversification and domestic stability — are best protected by realism, autonomy, and operational continuity, not by simplistic bets on regime outcomes. India’s security planners must therefore focus on what can be influenced and what must be managed, ensuring that India remains secure, connected, and strategically capacitated whatever the shape of Iran’s future.