India’s emergence as a significant defence exporter is reshaping not only its industrial landscape but also its diplomatic choices. As Indian-origin weapons enter global markets and conflicts, the line between commercial transactions, strategic partnerships and foreign policy is becoming increasingly difficult to draw.

India’s growing defence-export capability is a welcome development. Bharat Forge, through its defence subsidiary Kalyani Strategic Systems Ltd. (KSSL), has emerged as an important player in the development and export of 155-mm artillery systems. Its MArG family of mounted artillery guns in 39, 45 and 52 calibre configurations is being positioned for international markets.

This raises an interesting question when one looks at India’s evolving defence relationships with Europe. Suppose an Indian-made artillery gun is supplied to a European country such as Sweden. If that country subsequently transfers the gun to Ukraine, where it is used against Russian forces, where does that leave Indian diplomacy?

India could quite legitimately say that ‘we did not supply weapons to Ukraine. We supplied them to a sovereign customer under an export agreement.” But Moscow could equally point to the battlefield and say -“An Indian-made weapon is being used against Russian forces.”

The distinction between direct supply and onward transfer therefore becomes important. And this is not entirely hypothetical. Indian-made artillery ammunition has already reportedly reached Ukraine through European intermediaries, leading to Russian concerns and protests, even though India maintains restrictions on the unauthorised transfer of its defence exports.

This illustrates a dilemma that India will increasingly have to confront as its defence-export industry expands. The more successful Indian defence manufacturers become in international markets, the more difficult it may be to separate commercial defence exports from geopolitical consequences. India has consistently sought to maintain strategic autonomy, retaining relationships with Russia while simultaneously deepening defence cooperation with Europe, the United States and other partners. That becomes considerably more complicated when an Indian-origin weapon eventually finds itself on a battlefield in a conflict where India has deliberately chosen not to take sides.

The issue, therefore, is not whether India should become a defence exporter. It should. A strong domestic defence industry, greater self-reliance and a growing export base are all strategically valuable. But there is a larger question behind the success of India’s defence-export ambitions. The real test of India’s emerging defence-export power may not be whether it can manufacture weapons, but whether it can prevent its weapons from becoming instruments of conflicts in which India itself has chosen not to take sides. That is where defence policy, export controls and diplomacy inevitably converge.

India’s Defence Exports. There is, however, an important data issue. India does not publish a complete country-wise value table for defence exports. The Ministry of Defence publishes the overall export value and identifies some major destinations and products, while individual contracts and customs data allow us to build a much more useful picture.

The latest official figure is ₹38,424 crore (about US$4.5 billion) in FY 2025–26, up 62.66% from ₹23,622 crore in FY 2024–25. The government says exports went to more than 80 countries in FY 2025–26. Here is what we can establish with reasonable confidence:-

• Armenia. Indian defence products/equipment: Pinaka MBRL, Akash-1S SAM, ATAGS 155-mm guns, Swathi weapon-locating radar, ammunition and other artillery systems.
• Publicly reported value: around US$2 billion in defence contracts since 2022, although individual contract values vary.
• PhilippinesIndian defence products/equipment: BrahMos shore-based anti-ship missile system, ammunition, components and protective . equipment. Publicly reported value: US$375 million BrahMos contract.
• Indonesia. Indian defence products/equipment: BrahMos coastal-defence system and Astra air-to-air missiles. Publicly reported value: Not officially disclosed. Reports put the package at around US$300–630 million, depending on the deal and version reported.
• United States. Indian defence products/equipment like Aircraft and helicopter fuselages, wings, structures, avionics, radar and electronic components, sub-systems and other components. Publicly reported value is US$2.8 billion reported as Indian defence exports over recent years, predominantly components and sub-systems.
• France. Indian defence products/equipment: Radar and electronics, components, sub-systems and engineering products. Publicly reported value: Exact India defence-export value not publicly disclosed.
• Vietnam. Indian defence products/equipment: High-speed patrol/guard boats, naval equipment, submarine batteries and accessories, lightweight torpedoes. Publicly reported value is US$100 million Line of Credit associated with 12 patrol boats; individual export values are not fully disclosed.
• Mauritius. Indian defence products/equipment: Dornier aircraft, Dhruv/Chetak helicopter-related equipment and spares, patrol vessels and ammunition. Publicly reported value is generally not disclosed.
• Nepal. Indian defence products/equipment: ALH/Dhruv helicopters, Chetak helicopters, ammunition, spares and protective equipment. Publicly reported value is not disclosed.
• Maldives. Indian defence products/equipment: Dhruv helicopters, maritime patrol and naval equipment and spares. Publicly reported value is not disclosed.
• Myanmar. Indian defence products/equipment: Radar, sonar, naval equipment, lightweight torpedoes and other systems.
• Seychelles. Indian defence products/equipment: Maritime patrol equipment, radars and naval systems.
• Sri Lanka. Indian defence products/equipment: Naval and maritime equipment, radar/electronics and other defence items.
• Morocco. Indian defence products/equipment: WhAP infantry protected mobility vehicles and other equipment. Publicly reported value is not disclosed.
• Namibia. Indian defence products/equipment: Helicopters, spares and defence equipment.
• Nigeria. Indian defence products/equipment: Ammunition and other defence equipment.
• Israel. Indian defence products/equipment: Radar spare parts, electronics, components and defence sub-systems.
• Germany. Indian defence products/equipment: Components, mechanical parts and defence-related equipment.
• Belgium. Indian defence products/equipment: Defence components and electronics. Publicly reported value: Not disclosed.
• Malaysia. Indian defence products/equipment: Su-30MKM avionics, helicopter and MiG spares and related equipment.

An Interesting Distinction

The US is a major destination, but not necessarily because India is selling complete weapons systems to the US. A substantial part consists of Indian-made components entering the global supply chains of companies such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin – fuselages, wings, structures, avionics, electronics and other components.

By contrast, Armenia is important because it is buying complete Indian-origin weapon systems – Pinaka, Akash, ATAGS and Swathi. And the Philippines is the other particularly significant case: the US$375 million BrahMos contract is a clearly identifiable major export transaction. There is also now Indonesia, where India has concluded agreements covering BrahMos and an air-to-air missile; the value has not been officially disclosed. Reuters reported the agreement in July 2026.

Source of hard numbers. The UN/World Bank Comtrade data give country-by-country customs values for HS 93 (arms and ammunition). For example, in calendar 2025, India recorded about US$816.8 million of HS-93 exports, including:

• Romania – US$157.6 million
• Armenia – US$148.9 million
• Slovenia – US$105.2 million
• Egypt – US$93.8 million
• United States – US$56.4 million
• Philippines – US$54.0 million
• Israel – US$48.5 million
• Czech Republic — US$25.8 million
• Spain – US$23.9 million
• Türkiye – US$20.8 million

But this should NOT be presented as India’s total defence exports by country. HS-93 captures arms, ammunition and parts, whereas India’s official ₹38,424-crore figure also encompasses aircraft, ships, electronics, components, services and other categories. That is why the two numbers differ substantially.

There are, in fact, three different dimensions here:-

• Defence exports as Commerce. India sells a product because another country wants or needs it.
• Defence exports as strategic Signalling. the choice of customer and product can create or deepen a strategic relationship.
• Defence exports as Diplomacy. defence cooperation can become an instrument of foreign policy, even when the transaction itself is commercial.

In this regard, the Armenia example is particularly interesting because the products are not merely small arms or ammunition. Pinaka, Akash, ATAGS and Swathi represent fairly significant Indian defence capabilities. The Philippines/BrahMos relationship is another obvious example, where an export transaction also has a strategic maritime dimension. But I would be careful not to claim that every defence export is diplomacy. The large Indian export business involving components, structures, sub-systems and spares supplied to Western aerospace and defence companies is much more plausibly explained by commercial supply chains than by bilateral diplomacy.

When does a defence export remain a commercial transaction, and when does it become an instrument of diplomacy? Defence exports may conflate with diplomacy. Suppose India sells defence equipment to Nation A and Nation A subsequently transfers it to Ukraine. If India sells defence equipment to Nation A with an end-user restriction, and Nation A subsequently transfers it to Ukraine without India’s consent, India can legitimately say: “We supplied the equipment to A under an export agreement. We did not supply it to Ukraine.” But diplomacy is not necessarily confined to the legality of the original transaction.

India’s options

India could maintain that the military transfer was unauthorised and contrary to the conditions under which the original export was made. Yet, diplomatically, the fact remains that an Indian-origin weapon has entered a conflict in which India has deliberately chosen not to take sides. This is where the distinction between what India legally permitted and what India diplomatically chooses to do thereafter becomes important.

The issue is therefore not that every defence export is an instrument of diplomacy. Rather, a defence export can acquire diplomatic consequences when the equipment subsequently becomes part of another country’s geopolitical or military action. As India’s defence-export capabilities grow, this intersection between commerce, strategic signalling and diplomacy is likely to become increasingly difficult to ignore.

(The author is an Indian Army veteran and a contemporary affairs commentator. The views are personal. He can be reached at  kl.viswanathan@gmail.com)